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This thesis analyses three Colloquial Singapore English (CSE) particles – lor, lah, and hor – 
using the framework of relevance theory. Maintaining a distinction between pragmatic function 
and semantic meaning, I characterise the particles as signposts or instructions that the hearer uses 
to guide her understanding of the speaker’s utterances. The effect of intonation on the particles is 
also discussed, and I propose that when more than one pronunciation is available, the particle’s 
intonation contour serves as a signal for the utterance’s modality, e.g. a falling tone will mark a 
declarative/imperative while a rising tone will mark an interrogative. The different pragmatic 
functions commonly attributed to each particle can thus be explained as emergent results from the 
interaction between its unitary semantic meaning and the utterance’s modality as signalled by the 









Colloquial Singapore English (CSE) is a contact variety of English that counts as its substrates 
various South Asian immigrant languages such as Malay, Cantonese and Hokkien (Gupta 2006: 
244). This thesis will analyse three CSE discourse particles – lor, hor, and lah – using a 
relevance-theoretic framework and seek to account for how these particles are used in the 
Singapore speech community. In doing so, this thesis also attempts to reconcile a unitary 
characterisation of these discourse particles with the observed correspondence between their 
pragmatic functions and the pitch contours that these particles can be pronounced in. 
 
1.1 Discourse particles in CSE 
 
1.1.1 Development of CSE 
 
As an immigrant nation, a large number of languages and dialects exist in Singapore. Although 
the Singapore government implemented compulsory English-medium education after the Second 
World War in an attempt to promote widespread English acquisition, many Singaporean speakers 
were unable to become fully proficient in Standard English, and their imperfect English exhibited 
varying influences from their substrate languages. The predominance of Chinese settlers and 
traders in the early twentieth century had resulted in a majority Mandarin-dialect-speaking 
population in Singapore (primarily Hokkien and Teochew), with Malay and Tamil speakers 
respectively forming the next largest proportions (Bao 2001: 281). These languages provided the 
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loan words and even entire grammatical structures and constructions that were then standardised 
through successive generations of Singaporean speakers to form the Colloquial Singapore English 
(CSE) that is this thesis’s object of study. 
 
1.1.2 CSE discourse particles 
 
CSE contains a number of discourse particles1 that are mostly loans from Cantonese and Hokkien 
(Ler 2005: 35). In the literature, discourse markers and discourse particles are commonly defined 
as lexical items that do not contribute to the propositional, truth-functional content of an utterance 
(Fraser 1996; Jucker & Ziv 1998), and indeed we see in (1) and (2) that the truth-functional 
content of (1a) and (2a) are identical to their (b) counterparts: 
 
1) a. A:  Have some more food lah!2 
b. A:  Have some more food! 
2) a. A:  This is a good book meh? 
b. A:  This is a good book?   (Wee 2004: 117) 
 
However, despite being syntactically optional, CSE discourse particles often perform key 
pragmatic functions such as indicating the grammatical mood of the utterance, the speaker’s 
commitment to the proposition expressed or the speaker’s emotional tone (Gupta 1992; Gupta 
                                                     
1 Following Ler (2005), this thesis makes a distinction between discourse markers and discourse particles, 
categorising CSE lexical items like lah, lor, etc. as the latter – unlike discourse markers such as I mean and you 
know, these lexical items are monomorphemic and tend to occur at sentence- or phrase-final position (Ler 2005; 
Marie 1988; Wee 2004), although a few items such as hor may also appear after topic position as topic markers. 
 
2 Discourse participant labels have been amended to be in line with the conventions in this thesis – the speaker of 
utterance marked by the CSE particle is labelled as A and is taken to be female, while the hearer is labelled as B 
and is taken to be male, unless otherwise determined by the dialogue itself. CSE discourse particles, emphasised 
words, and the context of the conversation are italicised. 
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2006; Platt 1987; Wee 2004: 118). Some of these observed functions are listed below 
(paraphrases in brackets): 
 
3a) meh – indicates scepticism 
A:  You got girlfriend meh?  
(Are you sure you have a girlfriend? I don’t believe it.) 
  b) lor – indicates obviousness or a sense of resignation 
A:  What do they sell at the market? 
B: Sell fish lor, vegetable lor, meat lor, all this lah. 
(They sell fish, vegetables, meat, and the like at the market, all of which should 
have been obvious to you.) 
  c) hor – asserts and elicits support for a proposition 
A:  Remind me to tell Jim about the group meeting hor. 
(I assert that I want you to remind me to tell Jim about the group meeting, and wish 
you will agree to it.) 
B: Sure. No problem. 
  d) lah – indicates speaker’s mood/attitude and appeals to addressee to accommodate the 
mood/attitude 
A:  What do you want to talk about? 
B: Anything under the sun lah. 
(I feel like talking about anything under the sun, and hope that you can 
accommodate my mood.) 
  e) wat – indicates information as obvious and contradictory 
A:  I dam stupid lah! I shouldn’t have stopped [my dance classes]. 
(I’m so stupid! I shouldn’t have stopped [my dance classes].) 
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B:  You can start now wat! 
(It should be obvious to you that you can start classes again. I don’t believe you 
can’t do that.)    (Wee 2004: 118-24) 
 
1.2 Aims of the study 
 
Although the current body of work on CSE particles has done much to confirm the object of 
study as a worthy one, both empirically as well as theoretically, this thesis hopes to address a few 
issues that I feel are present in current research on CSE particles. 
 
1.2.1 Over-focus on individual particles 
 
Other than Gupta (1992; 2006), researchers have tended to analyse CSE particles individually. 
While some researchers focus on describing the pragmatic functions of CSE particles based on 
observed examples of their use (Gan 2000; Kwan-Terry 1978; Kwan-Terry 1992; Marie 1988; 
Platt & Ho 1989), others base their characterisations on a wide variety of theoretical frameworks, 
creating a fragmentary landscape in which different particles are analysed according to different 
(and sometimes incompatible) models. For instance, lah has been analysed variously as a ‘code 
label’ marking solidarity (Richards & Tay 1977); a signal of illocutionary force under speech act 
theory (Bell & Ser 1983); a marker of epistemic modality (Gupta 1992; Gupta 2006); and an 
accommodation or assertion marker for the exchange of beliefs between speaker and hearer under 
a Natural Semantic Metalanguage framework (Besemeres & Wierzbicka 2003; Wong 2004) as 
well as relevance theory (Ler 2005; Ler 2006). More recently, a common ground approach has 
been used to analyse hor (Kim & Wee 2009) and wat (Siraj 2009). 
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I believe that analysing CSE particles using a single theoretical framework will be useful in 
determining how each particle relates to other particles, as well as uncovering aspects of the CSE 
particle system as a whole. As the characterisation of each particle would have to be consistent 
within the system, this will also have the advantage of allowing researchers to develop more 
accurate representations by triangulating across the different particles. For instance, it would be 
unlikely for lah to be a code label marking solidarity, following Richards and Tay (1977), without 
other particles marking other communicative styles, and the fact that they do not would suggest 
that the characterisation of lah as a code label may be mistaken. Conversely, a theory that is able 
to account for all the particles and their uses in a consistent fashion would be more likely to be a 
true description of the particles. Due to time and space constraints, this thesis analyses only three 
CSE particles using a relevance theoretic framework. However, the success of the analyses 
suggests that relevance theory may be equally productive when applied to the other particles in 
CSE. 
 
1.2.2 Conflation between meaning and function 
 
From a theoretical standpoint, this thesis follows Wong (2004) and Ler (2005; 2006) in 
maintaining a distinction between the meaning of a particle and its pragmatic function, and 
analysing the latter as a result of how the hearer interprets the former. Like Ler (2005; 2006), I 
define the meaning of a particle as the instructions to the hearer that are procedurally encoded3 in 
the particle, and distinguish this from the pragmatic functions of a particle, which are the final 
effects or results of the hearer’s pragmatic processing of the particle. Analytically, the procedural 
meaning of the particle is taken to be the simplest description of the particle that cannot be 
attributed to additional pragmatic processing by the hearer. Given this distinction between 
                                                     
3 Procedural encoding will be elaborated upon in the next chapter on relevance theory. 
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encoded meaning and pragmatic function, I follow Ler (2005; 2006) in using relevance theory as 
the analytical framework for my thesis as it is able to model how the hearer interprets the 
particle’s encoded meaning with specific contextual information to arrive at its various pragmatic 
functions. 
 
1.2.3 Correspondence between intonation contour and pragmatic function 
 
Pakir (1992) observes that “the meaning of particles are tied to intonation and tonicity, and they 
therefore are not unifunctional nor uniform in their representation or meaning” (144). Given this 
correspondence between differences in pronunciation and pragmatic function, many researchers 
propose that certain CSE particles have different lexical variants based on their phonological 
properties. Kwan-Terry (1978; 1992) as well as Bell and Ser (1983) propose that there are two 
variants of lah that are distinguished by duration and stress, although they disagree on the 
pragmatic function associated with each variant – while Kwan-Terry (1978) believes that the 
stressed lah marks social intimacy between speaker and hearer and the unstressed lah social 
distance, Bell and Ser (1983) believe the converse to be true. Loke and Low (1988) distinguish 
between the communicative functions (assertions, commands, rejections, etc.) and emotive 
attitudes (irritation, annoyance, etc.) of lah and propose that pitch height and intonational 
variations (and to some extent duration) contribute to the former while duration and stress 
contribute to the latter (157). In contrast, Wong (2004) analyses lah using only pitch height, 
positing four variants of lah4 that differ in the force with which the speaker insists the hearer take 
up a given proposition. For hor, both Gan (2000) and Marie (1988) distinguish between at least 
two phonological variants based on intonation contour, i.e. a rising or falling tone, although Gan 
(2000) separates rising-tone hor into three variants with different pragmatic functions such as to 
                                                     
4 Although Wong (2004) distinguishes between four variants of lah, one variant is rarely used and thus is not 
covered in his study. 
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signal the beginning of new information, elicit agreement from the hearer, etc. Conversely, 
researchers who take a unitary approach (e.g. Besemeres and Wierzbicka (2003), Gupta (1992; 
Gupta 2006), Ler (2005; 2006)) tend to ignore the issue of intonation altogether and account for 
the different pragmatic functions of a particle using one general function such as accommodation 
(Besemeres and Wierzbicka (2003), Ler (2005; 2006)). 
 
This thesis takes a different approach, analysing the intonation contour of a particle as an 
independent factor that the hearer takes into account in arriving at the pragmatic function of a 
particle. This will allow the correspondence between intonation and the pragmatic function of a 
particle to be accounted for while maintaining a unitary meaning of the particle. 
 
1.3 Sources of data 
 
Although early researchers used informally observed examples that generally do not extend 
beyond the marked utterance, such as “Can lah”, “Cannot lah” (Tongue 1974, as cited in Ler 
2005) and “Not sure lah”, “What to do lah!” (Richards & Tay 1977), more recent research has 
taken advantage of corpus data such as ICE-SIN, a one-million word lexical corpus of Singapore 
English collected at the National University of Singapore (Ler (2005; 2006); Wee (2002)) as well 
as data recorded in a naturalistic setting (Gupta (1992; 2006)). In addition, researchers have 
directly obtained data from CSE speakers through interviews (Bell and Ser (1983)) and recorded 
conversations (Deterding (1994); Marie (1988)), as well as questionnaires that elicited 
acceptability judgements (Bell and Ser (1983), Ler (2005; 2006)). In some cases, researchers who 
are themselves native CSE speakers have constructed artificial examples or relied on their own 




In this thesis, examples are drawn either from the spoken component of ICE-SIN or from 
personal conversations (edited for clarity). Following researchers like Ler (2005; 2006), Siraj 
(2009), and Wong (2004), I have also relied on my own linguistic intuitions as a native CSE 
speaker to construct artificial examples of infelicitous uses of the particles, which cannot be 
obtained through naturalistic observation.  
 
1.4 General overview 
 
The three CSE discourse particles analysed in this thesis – lor, hor, and lah – were chosen for two 
reasons. Firstly, all three particles have often been characterised as being polysemous or as 
having different lexical variants: lor has been characterised as being able to convey either a sense 
of obviousness or resignation, while hor and lah have different pragmatic functions when they are 
pronounced with different pitch contours. As stated in the previous section, this thesis aims to 
develop a unitary characterisation of the two particles that can nevertheless account for the 
different pragmatic functions that have been attributed to them. 
 
Secondly, although lor, hor, and lah can all be used with declaratives, there are constraints on 
their use with non-declaratives. For instance, lor and hor can only be used with certain 
imperatives: 
 
4) a. A:  Eat your ice cream lor. It’s melting already. 
b. A:  Eat your ice cream hor. It’s melting already. 
c. A:  Eat your ice cream lah. It’s melting already. 
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5) (A wants B to stop talking.) 
a. A:  * Stop talking lor. 
b. A:  Stop talking hor. 
c. A:  Stop talking lah. 
 
6) (A holds out her hand to B.) 
a. A:  * Give me some money lor. 
b. A:  * Give me some money hor. 
c. A:  Give me some money lah. 
 
Similarly, how these particles are used in interrogatives is also constrained: 
 
7) a. A:  * Your name is John lor? 
b. A:  Your name is John hor? 
c. A:  * Your name is John lah? 
 
8) a. A:  * Is your name John lor? 
b. A:  * Is your name John hor? 
c. A:  * Is your name John lah? 
 
9) a. A:  * What is your name lor? 
b. A:  * What is your name hor? 
c. A:  What is your name lah? 
 




3b) lor  –  indicates obviousness or a sense of resignation 
  c) hor –  asserts and elicits support for a proposition 
  d) lah –  indicates speaker’s mood/attitude and appeals to addressee to accommodate 
the mood/attitude 
 
For instance, the characterisation of lor as indicating obviousness cannot explain why lor cannot 
be used with an obvious imperative in (5a), and the characterisation of lah as indicating the 
speaker’s mood and appealing to the hearer to accommodate it cannot explain why lah can only 
be used in (9c) and not (8c). This thesis outlines an alternate analysis of each particle that will be 
able to account for these constraints. 
 
Each chapter of this thesis will analyse one particle – lor in Chapter 3, hor in Chapter 4, and lah 
in Chapter 5. In each chapter, I will provide an overview of the previous characterisations of the 
particle as well as their problems before outlining my proposed analysis of the particle. Before 
these analyses, I cover the fundamental concepts of relevance theory in Chapter 2, which I will 
use as my analytical framework. The final chapter will present a discussion of the findings and 




THE RELEVANCE-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Relevance theory proposes that retrieving the meaning behind an utterance does not depend 
solely on decoding the linguistic information present in the words, but involves interpreting the 
utterance based on (a) the linguistic information of the words as well as (b) prior assumptions and 
other contextual information that the communicators hold in their cognitive environments to 
arrive at what the hearer believes the speaker to mean (Sperber & Wilson 1995). This chapter will 
lay out the fundamental concepts of relevance theory that I will be using in my analysis. 
 
2.1 Cognitive environments and cognitive effects 
 
Relevance theory assumes that human beings are efficient information processors that constantly 
seek to improve their representations of the world while minimising processing costs (Sperber & 
Wilson 1995: 48). A person’s cognitive representation of the world is characterised by Sperber 
and Wilson as a cognitive environment, which “consists of not only all the facts that he is aware 
of, but also all the facts that he is capable of becoming aware of, in his physical environment” 
(1995: 39); these facts that a person is capable of becoming aware of are in turn defined as being 
manifest. A person may be aware of information through perception (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 39) 
– for example, the proposition “There is no money in my wallet” can easily be visually verified, 
and so is manifest to an individual. In turn, facts that are derived from these perceptual facts or 
are capable of being derived from them are also manifest, e.g. “I cannot buy anything from the 
grocery store (because there is no money in my wallet)”. Sperber and Wilson note further that 
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manifestness is distinct from accessibility or knowledge, as an assumption can be manifest 
without actually being represented in a person’s mind, as long as it can be inferred from her other 
assumptions, or by the hearer’s knowledge of the world (1995: 40). 
 
Sperber and Wilson argue that in order for communication to take place, the speaker must be able 
to attract the attention of the hearer, who will only pay attention if he believes that the 
informational benefit that the speaker can supply is worth the processing cost in attending to her. 
The informational benefit, or cognitive effect5, that an utterance supplies, relative to the effort 
required in processing it, is defined as the relevance of an utterance. Crucially, Sperber and 
Wilson propose that every speaker aims to maximise for the hearer the cognitive effect of her 
utterances relative to the effort required to process them; in other words, every speaker aims for 
her utterances to be optimally relevant (1995: 157).  Each hearer, in turn, assumes that every 
utterance will be optimally relevant, and this guides how he interprets the utterance. In relevance 
theory, this assumption is formalised as the Presumption of Optimal Relevance (Sperber & 
Wilson 1995: 158).  
 
To illustrate, (1) can be interpreted in two ways, (2a) and (2b): 
 
1) George has a big cat. 
 
2) a. George has a big domestic cat. 
b. George has a tiger, lion, jaguar, etc. (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 168) 
 
                                                     
5 Sperber and Wilson (1995) use the term ‘contextual effect’ instead, but I believe that Blakemore’s (2002) 
term better reflects relevance theory’s emphasis on the cognitive nature of pragmatic processing. 
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Sperber and Wilson argue that if (2b) was the desired interpretation, the utterance would achieve 
greater relevance in the form of (3a-c): 
 
3) a. George has a tiger. 
b. George has a tiger or a lion, I’m not sure which. 
c. George has a felid.   (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 168) 
 
This greater relevance is due to the fact that (3a-c) would have reduced the processing cost 
needed to interpret the utterance by eliminating the need to access and consider (2a). Since the 
hearer always assumes that the given utterance is the optimally relevant one, she will therefore 
reject (2b) as a likely interpretation for (1) and interpret the utterance to mean (2a).6 
 
2.2 Cognitive benefits of an utterance 
 
To characterise the concept of relevance more precisely, an utterance can provide cognitive 
benefits (and hence relevance) to the hearer by affecting the contextual assumptions he holds in 
the following ways (Blakemore 2002: 61; Sperber & Wilson 1995: 115): 
 
a) By eliminating an existing assumption 
b) By modifying the strength of an existing assumption (by strengthening or contradicting 
it) 
                                                     
6 Of course, the concept of optimal relevance also takes into account the speaker’s communicative constraints. 
For example, the speaker may not have known the term ‘felid’ or the specific type of felid George has, but has 
frequently used the phrase ‘big cat’ to describe them to the hearer, and so (1) could still be optimally relevant 
given the speaker’s communicative constraints. However, I will not be looking into the speaker’s communicative 
constraints in this thesis. 
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c) By combining with an existing assumption to yield a contextual (deductive) 
implication 
 
The strength of an assumption is defined as the confidence with which the person holding the 
assumption believes it to be true – facts that the person can readily verify for herself will be of 
high strength, while information obtained from other people would be assessed based on the 
sources’ perceived reliability; alternatively, the strength of a contextual implication will depend 
on the strength of its premises (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 77). The strength of an assumption may 
also change as a result of new information, which, as stated previously, will result in an increase 
in cognitive effect. To illustrate, consider (4): 
 
4) a. B: (to A) Jane likes caviar. 
b. A sees Jane eating caviar with a big smile. 
c. A sees Jane turning down an offer of caviar. 
(adapted from Sperber and Wilson (1995: 77)) 
 
In order to assess the strength of the proposition ‘Jane likes caviar’, A must determine the 
reliability of B’s information: for example, she would accept the proposition as being of high 
strength if she knows that B is a good friend of Jane, and of lower strength if she knows that B 
does not know Jane well. Subsequent information that relates to the proposition will provide 
cognitive effect by affecting its strength – information that is consistent with the proposition, e.g. 




2.3 Procedural encoding 
 
Other than by the presumption of optimal relevance, utterance interpretation can also be guided 
by linguistic expressions that explicitly encode “information about the inferential process that the 
hearer should use” (Blakemore 2002: 90). For example, the relationship between the two 
statements (5a) and (5b) can be interpreted in two ways, (6a) and (6b), depending on whether the 
discourse connective so or after all is used: 
 
5) a. Ben can open Tom’s safe. 
b. He knows the combination.    (Blakemore 2002: 78) 
 
6) a. Ben can open Tom’s safe. So he knows the combination. ((5b) as the conclusion 
given (5a)) 
b. Ben can open Tom’s safe. After all, he knows the combination.  ((5a) as the 
conclusion given (5b))    (Blakemore 2002: 79) 
 
Blakemore argues that to interpret (6a), the hearer will combine (5a) (reproduced as (7a)) and the 
existing assumption (7b) that has been made salient in the hearer’s cognitive environment to 
derive the contextual implication (7c), which acts to strengthen the utterance (5b). Similarly, to 
interpret (6b), the hearer will combine (5b) (reproduced as (8a)) and the existing assumption (8b) 
made salient in the hearer’s cognitive environment to derive the contextual implication (8c), 
which acts to strengthen the original utterance (5a): 
 
7) a. Ben can open Tom’s safe. 
b.  If Ben can open Tom’s safe, then he knows the combination of Tom’s safe. 
c.  Ben knows the combination of Tom’s safe. 
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8) a.  Ben knows the combination of Tom’s safe. 
b.  If Ben knows the combination of Tom’s safe, then he can open Tom’s safe. 
c.  Ben can open Tom’s safe.     (Blakemore 2002: 90) 
 
Blakemore analyses such linguistic expressions as encoding procedural information (2002: 78) 
and distinguishes it from conceptual information, which are propositional representations of the 
world that are encoded by most lexical items. As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis will analyse CSE 
discourse particles as encoding procedural information – in other words, the semantic ‘meaning’ 
of CSE particles will be characterised as instructions that guide the hearer’s pragmatic 
interpretation of the marked utterance. 
 
2.4 Interrogatives and imperatives in relevance theory 
 
Since this thesis will be analysing how the CSE particles lor, hor and lah are used in answers to 
questions and in imperatives in addition to standard propositions, it is important to understand 
how interrogatives and imperatives in general are analysed in relevance theory. According to 
Sperber and Wilson (1988), non-declarative sentences encode representations of potentiality and 
desirability – imperatives represent descriptions of state of affairs that are potential and desirable, 
and interrogatives represent descriptions of thoughts that are desirable. 
 
2.4.1 Imperatives in relevance theory 
 
Imperatives are taken as descriptions of possible rather than actual situations (Clark 1991; 
Sperber & Wilson 1988). A direct imperative would encode a proposition describing a potential 
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situation that would be desirable to the speaker of the imperative, while advice, instructions, and 
the granting of permission describe potential situations that are desirable to the hearer of the 
imperatives. The force of an imperative is then derived from an interaction between the 
proposition described by the imperative itself and other contextual assumptions that are held by 
the hearer. For instance, the direct imperative “Come here!” might be processed by the hearer 
roughly as follows: 
 
9) Encoded proposition:  
It is potential and desirable to the speaker that the hearer goes towards her. 
Contextual assumption:  
The speaker has authority over the hearer. 
Contextual Implication:  
Since the speaker has authority over the hearer and would like the hearer to render the 
state of affairs described by the imperative actual, the hearer should obey the speaker 
and perform the action required of the imperative. 
Contextual Implication:  
(Action: The hearer goes towards the speaker.) 
 
Since the linguistic meaning of the imperative only conveys the achievability and desirability of 
the state of affairs described, other utterances that convey the same meaning can also function as 
imperatives as the hearer tries to process the utterance to derive optimal relevance, e.g. (10): 
 
10) (A has just entered B’s house.) 
A: I need a drink. 
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Based on the presumption of optimal relevance, B would interpret A’s utterance as indicating, not 
merely a statement that she needs a drink, but that it is potential and desirable that she be given a 
drink (since this leads to greater cognitive effect). This interpretation will thus lead B to a similar 
inferential route to (9) despite the utterance being in declarative form. 
 
In contrast, the state of affairs described in advice, suggestions, and granting of permission are 
desirable to the hearer rather than to the speaker: 
 
11) B: Excuse me, I want to get to the station. 
A: Take a number 3 bus.   (Sperber & Wilson 1988: 5) 
 
Encoded proposition:  
It is potential and desirable to the hearer that she takes a number 3 bus if she wants to 
get to the station. 
 
12) B: Can I open the window? 
A: Oh, open it then.    (Sperber & Wilson 1988: 5) 
 
Encoded proposition:  
It is potential and desirable to the hearer that she open the window. (The potentiality is 
granted by A.) 
 
Since the speaker is not concerned about whether the state of affairs described in the imperative is 
brought about in such cases, the imperative force experienced by the hearer from the speaker in 
direct imperatives is absent here. 
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2.4.2 Interrogatives in relevance theory 
 
As stated previously, interrogatives are taken as representations for thoughts desirable to the 
speaker. Sperber and Wilson (1988) propose that “a thought is desirable only if it is relevant” 
(23), and therefore interrogatives indicate propositions that would be relevant to the speaker if the 
hearer confirms them to be true. For example: 
 
13) B: Is John smart? 
 
Encoded proposition:  
The proposition “John is smart” is relevant to the speaker if true. (In this case, the 
converse proposition “John is not smart” is also relevant as a disconfirmation of the 
original proposition.) 
 
14) B:  So what are you going to cook? 
 
Encoded proposition:  
The incomplete proposition “[Hearer] is going to cook what” would be relevant to the 
speaker once the hearer replaces the wh-word with actual content, e.g. “[Hearer] is 
going to cook bee hoon and chicken wings”. 
 
The presumption of optimal relevance also guides the interpretation of answers. In cases where 
the answer supplied in response to a question is different from the answer desired, the person 
asking the question will still assume that the hearer is aiming for optimal relevance and try to 
derive the immediately relevant proposition from the hearer’s answer, e.g. (15): 
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15) B: Is John smart? 
A: He did study at MIT. 
 
Encoded proposition in B’s utterance:  
The proposition “John is smart” is relevant to the speaker if true. 
 
a. Stated utterance: 
 John studied at MIT. 
b. Contextual assumption: 
 Everyone who studied at MIT is smart. 
c. Contextual implication: 
 John is smart. 
 
Although A did not explicitly supply the proposition that would be immediately relevant to B, B 
assumes that A is still trying to be optimally relevant, and so derives the relevant answer (15c) by 
interpreting the stated utterance (15a) as a deductive premise. In this case, the additional 
processing costs are offset by the additional cognitive benefit that A intends, i.e. the implication 




Relevance theory assumes that utterance interpretation is guided by the hearer’s assumption that 
the speaker is aiming at optimal relevance, i.e. to provide the maximum cognitive benefit to the 
hearer relative to the processing costs in interpreting the utterance. However, the speaker may 
also use linguistic expressions that encode procedural information to guide the hearer’s 
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interpretation of her utterance more effectively. In this chapter, I outlined the fundamental 
concepts of relevance theory that I would be using in my thesis. As the CSE particles lor, hor and 
lah are used in answers to questions and in imperatives in addition to standard propositions, this 
chapter also elaborated on how interrogatives and imperatives are characterised in relevance 
theory: imperatives are taken as descriptions of possible situations that are desirable to either the 
speaker or the hearer, while interrogatives are taken as representations for desirable thoughts, also 
to either the speaker or the hearer (Clark 1991; Sperber & Wilson 1988). 
 
Ler (2005; 2006) proposes that CSE discourse particles can be analysed under a relevance-
theoretic framework as markers that encode processing instructions for utterance interpretation. In 
the subsequent chapters, I will extend Ler’s analytical framework to analyse three CSE particles: 
lor, hor and lah. As intonation contour plays an important role in how CSE particles are 
interpreted, my thesis will also focus on how intonation contour interacts with the unitary 




THE ‘LOR’ PARTICLE 
 
The discourse particle lor is perhaps most often used to signal the obviousness of an utterance. In 
(1), A is stressing that the items he is saying are available at the market should be obvious to B: 
 
1) B:  What do they sell at the market? 
A:  Sell fish lor, vegetable lor, meat lor, all this lah.  (Platt & Ho 1989: 217) 
 
Lor is also commonly used in utterances that convey a sense of resignation (Wee 2002). In (2), 
while A first uses lor to indicate that it should be obvious to B that she will not stop working, her 
subsequent uses of lor express her resignation of the fact that she might not marry or have 
children as a result of her pursuing her career: 
 
2) A:  I would never give up my career. I need my own steady income. 
B:  But, um, I might stop working for a while if need to, if I need to lah. Especially for 
looking after kids. 
A:  But for me, I won’t, I won’t stop lor. The most I won’t give birth to kids lor. For 
the most I  don’t marry lor (laughs).   
(GSEC, as cited in Wee 2002: 720) 
 
Although the particle has been characterised by some researchers as marking these two pragmatic 
functions exclusively (Platt & Ho 1989; Wee 2002), there are also instances in which lor is not 
used to mark either obviousness or resignation: 
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3) (A and B are college students taking different modules. B has no prior knowledge 
about A’s tutor.)  
B:  Have you gotten back your paper yet?  
A: Not yet! I even handed it in before the deadline lor! 
 
4) B:  Didn’t John convert to vegetarianism some time back? 
A:  Yah. He says he’s vegetarian. But I see him eat meat sometimes lor. 
 
In both (3) and (4), the utterances marked by lor are clearly not obvious to the hearer. In the 
former, B does not know that A handed her paper in before the deadline; in the latter, B is 
ignorant of the fact that John eats meat even though John says he is a vegetarian. The particle is 
also not used to convey a sense of resignation in both examples. In (3), A uses lor to convey a 
tone of indignation at her tutor; in (4), A seems to use lor convey a sense of disapproval rather 
than resignation at the fact that John still eats meat sometimes.  
 
In this chapter, I propose that the speaker uses the particle lor to indicate to the hearer that the 
immediately relevant proposition is either directly accessible in the hearer’s cognitive 
environment or can be derived from accessible premises. This indication of the proposition’s 
manifestness is further guaranteed by the speaker to provide additional relevance to the hearer – 
rather than analysing lor as being polysemous between conveying a sense of obviousness and 
resignation (Wee 2002), I argue that a sense of resignation is one of the ways the hearer obtains 
additional relevance from recognising the manifestness of the speaker’s proposition. 
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3.1 Previous characterisations of lor 
 
3.1.1 Lor as a marker for obviousness 
 
Platt and Ho (1989) characterise lor as a marker to stress the ‘obviousness’ of an utterance, i.e. 
“matters which the speaker assumes the addressee to know already” (217). Recall (1), where A 
uses lor to stress that the items he is saying are available at the market should be obvious to B: 
 
1) B: What do they sell at the market? 
A: Sell fish lor, vegetable lor, meat lor, all this lah.  (Platt & Ho 1989: 217) 
 
Lor can also be used to reiterate information introduced earlier in the conversation: 
 
5) (A and B are discussing the age of A’s niece) 
A: Uh [in] March, [A’s niece] will be two years old lah. 
B: Oh two years. So now, [she’s] one plus, almost two uh. 
A: Almost two lor.     (ICE-SIN S1A-091) 
 
Using Platt’s and Ho’s definition, we might take lor to encode the following meaning: 
 
6) p: The proposition marked by lor 
lor: The speaker asserts that p is a matter “which the speaker assumes the addressee to 
know already” (Platt & Ho 1989: 217) 
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However, this characterisation of lor is problematic as lor-marked utterances can also contain 
information the addressee is unaware of at the point of utterance. In (7), A and B are talking about 
a Dinner & Dance that B will be attending. B has heard that Dr Teo, a professor they both know, 
will be bringing his two children to the dinner, but A points out that Dr Teo’s son is not in 
Singapore at the moment: 
 
7) A: No wat his son is not in Singapore. 
B: Oh. 
A: He's in overseas. 
B: Then who who is that two? 
A: He got another son and daughter lor. 
B: Oh is it? 
A: Ya.     (ICE-SIN S1A-014) 
 
The characterisation in (6) thus gives a wrong interpretation of A’s lor-marked utterance in (7), as 
seen below: 
 
8) A: He got another son and daughter lor. 
p: Dr Teo has another son and daughter apart from the one who is overseas 
lor: A asserts that p is a matter which A assumes B to know already. 
 
Since B had mistakenly assumed that Dr Teo has only two children, A cannot be asserting that the 
alternative that Dr Teo has more than two children is a matter that B knows already. Instead, A 
presumably uses lor to mark the alternative – that Dr Teo has more than two children – as the 
only possible conclusion to be reached given the situation, and to remind B of this fact. 
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To account for this use of lor, one possible solution could be to change the definition of 
‘obviousness’ to refer to matters that the hearer should have known already. However, this 
modified definition is still unable to account for cases such as (4) (reproduced below as (9)): 
 
9) B: Didn’t John convert to vegetarianism some time back? 
A: Yah. He says he’s vegetarian. But I see him eat meat sometimes lor. 
 
In (9), the lor-marked proposition that John eats meat sometimes would not have been expected 
by B – the proposition is not only inconsistent with A’s prior statement that John has said he is 
vegetarian, it also goes against B’s original implied belief that John has converted to 
vegetarianism. As such, it does not seem likely that A would use lor to indicate that the fact that 
John eats meat sometimes should be obvious to B. 
 
Similar to (9), how A’s utterance in (10) could be taken to be ‘obvious’ is also unclear given our 
present definitions of ‘obviousness’: 
 
10) A: Uhm busy playing with my nieces. 
B: Both of them are in their own place eh at your home now? 
A: Hah. The younger one is always at my home mah. 
B: Both of them. Orh. 
A: My mum look after her. 
B: Ah. 




It is unlikely for B to have known that A’s sister has brought her older niece to her place, given 
that B has just called A for a chat. The fact that A’s niece was brought down by her sister is also 
only one of a few likely possibilities, e.g. she came over to wait for her mother to get off work, 
A’s mother brought her over to be with her sister, etc. It is therefore hard to argue, following 
either the strict definition of ‘obviousness’ in (6) or its looser variation, that A marked her 
utterance with lor as she believes that B either knows or should have known that A’s sister has 
brought her older niece to her place. 
 
As such, although lor can indeed be used by the speaker to signal that an utterance should be 
obvious to the hearer, a characterisation of lor as an ‘obviousness’ marker would be unable to 
explain how the particle can also be used to mark utterances that are not immediately obvious to 
the hearer. 
 
3.1.2 Lor as a marker for resignation 
 
Wee (2002) extends Platt and Ho’s characterisation of lor as an obviousness marker, proposing 
that it is a “marker of affect in that it indicates a particular emotional state” (712), i.e. resignation. 
He suggests that in certain situations, what one can or should do is so constrained by the situation 
that it becomes ‘obvious’, and the implication follows that one’s individual preferences or wishes 
are irrelevant to what one must eventually do (2002: 723). In such situations, lor will mark both 
the obviousness of the utterance as well as resignation on the part of the speaker.  
 
11) A: (expressing to B her reluctance to visit her uncle during Chinese New Year) We 
went it’s because we went because my grandmother was there lor. 
(Wee 2002: 721) 
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In (11), the hearer is expected to recover the implication that because A’s grandmother had been 
at her uncle’s place during Chinese New Year, it is obvious to both speaker and hearer that A had 
no choice but to visit her uncle because of that, and she uses lor to mark her resignation to the 
fact. 
 
Although Wee (2002) states that “the particle is effectively polysemous ... [i.e.], the particle is 
able to express both the more objective notion of ‘obviousness’ as well as the more subjective 
notion of ‘resignation’” (723), the theoretical value of characterising resignation as an inherent 
function of lor is debatable. While the analysis of lor as a resignation marker does account better 
for how the particle is used in (11) than Platt and Ho’s analysis of lor as an obviousness marker, 
whether lor is used to mark resignation or obviousness in (12) (adapted from Wee (2002)) can 
only be determined through subsequent utterances (in italics) that disambiguate between the two 
((13) and (14) respectively): 
 
12) (A is telling B about the dishes that she is going to cook for the coming Chinese New 
Year festivities.) 
B:  So what are you going to cook? 
A: Bee hoon [fried noodles] or fried rice lor, chicken wing lor. 
 
13) (Subsequent utterances (in italics) show that A does not like preparing bee hoon, fried 
rice, and chicken wings.) 
B: So what are you going to cook? 
A: Bee hoon or fried rice lor, chicken wing lor. The children like to eat such things, so  
 what else can I cook? 
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14) (A does not show any overt preference towards what she is preparing for Chinese New 
Year.) 
B: So what are you going to cook? 
A: Bee hoon or fried rice lor, chicken wing lor. I thought I’ve told you this already? 
 
In addition to being necessary in determining the pragmatic function of lor, context is also 
sufficient in determining whether an utterance is taken to be resigned or obvious ((15) and (16) 
respectively): 
 
15) B: So what are you going to cook? 
A: Bee hoon, fried rice, and chicken wings. The children like to eat such things, so  
 what else can I cook? 
 
16) B: So what are you going to cook? 
A: Bee hoon, fried rice, and chicken wings. I thought I’ve told you this already? 
 
Since (13) can be taken to be resigned only through contextual information, and (15) can be taken 
to be resigned through contextual information even without the presence of lor, it appears that the 
sense of resignation that is conveyed with lor-marked utterances can be attributed to contextual 
information, rather than being an inherent function of the particle itself. 
 
In addition, the characterisation of lor as an affective marker for resignation neglects the fact that 
the particle can also be used with utterances that are non-resignative in nature: 
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17) (A and B are college students taking different modules. B has no prior knowledge 
about A’s tutor.) 
B:  Have you gotten back your paper yet?  
A: Not yet! And I even handed it in before the deadline lor! 
 
18) (A and B are discussing about the issue of women in the workforce.) 
B: They should just stay at home and have kids! No wonder there’re so many divorces 
now! 
A: You’re always saying such nonsense lor! Can’t you think first before you speak? 
 
As discussed previously, (17) conveys the speaker’s indignation at the tutor for not returning her 
paper despite her having submitted it early, while (18) conveys the speaker’s annoyance at the 
hearer for saying something she considers nonsense. Once again, it must be noted that despite 
Wee’s claim that lor can express either obviousness or resignation, lor conveys neither in the 
examples above. Although one might argue that A is emphasising to B in (18) that it should be 
obvious to him that he always speaks nonsense, the same could not be said for (17) – as B has no 
prior knowledge about A’s tutor or how he handles his modules, there is no reason for A to 
believe that B should have known that A’s tutor has not returned her paper to her yet.  
 
Given that the particle can be acceptably used to express other emotional stances of the speaker 
apart from resignation, one would have to either conclude that these other stances are somehow 
also linguistically encoded by lor, or attribute the resignative stance that is often marked by lor to 
additional pragmatic processing based on lor’s encoded meaning and the wider context of the 
conversation. I will argue for the latter in this chapter. 
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3.1.3 Lor as a marker for a directive or suggestion 
 
Rather than studying each CSE particle in isolation, Gupta (1992) attempts to characterise CSE 
particles as a group using a framework of epistemic modality (Givón 1993, cited in Gupta 2006). 
Specifically, epistemic modality conveys the speaker’s attitude towards “epistemic judgements of 
truth, probability, certainty, belief or evidence” (Gupta 2006: 246), and Gupta proposes that CSE 
particles can be productively analysed as encoding the degree to which the speaker is committed 
to the truth value of the marked utterance (259). Arranging 11 CSE particles along a single scale 
of assertiveness, ranging from contradiction, assertion, to tentativeness, she proposes that lor is a 
weak assertive particle that can be used “to mark a directive or to create a suggestion, apparently 
without expectation of compliance” (1992: 43), and gives the following as an example:  
 
19) (B is a young girl, and A is B’s mother. In this example, B is having trouble opening 
the wrapper of a chocolate bar.) 
A: (passing another chocolate bar to B) This one you take lor.  
(Gupta 1992: 43) 
 
Gupta also claims that lor is unable to mark a direct imperative as it is a weak assertive particle; 
however, this restriction of lor is unaccounted for by either Platt and Ho (1989) or Wee (2002). In 
support of Gupta’s claim, we see that the imperatives in (20) and (21) cannot be marked by lor 
even though they are either obvious or should be obvious to the hearer: 
 
20) A:  (to B) ? Give me $20 lor. I need to take a taxi back but I don’t have any money. 
 
21) (B is A’s young daughter, who is playing in the field) 
A: ? Don’t step in the mud lor. You’ll dirty your new shoes! 
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However, Gupta’s (1992) proposal that lor is a weak assertive marker fails to explain why the 
particle is most often used to mark obviousness. An adequate characterisation of lor must 
therefore be able to account for both sets of observations under a single consistent framework. 
 
3.1.4 Other issues 
 
Research into the particle lor have generally assumed that lor marks the utterance that it appears 
with. For example, Platt and Ho (1989) describe the particle as “mark[ing] off the part of the 
utterance which refers to matters which the speaker assumes the addressee to know already” 
(217). Similarly, Wee (2002) proposes that “by attaching lor to an utterance, the speaker indicates 
that the situation described by the utterance is one over which nothing can be done” (712). 
Formally, this can be expressed as follows: 
 
22) Speaker:  p lor. 
lor: The speaker asserts that p is a matter of obviousness/resignation/etc. 
 
However, in certain situations, the proposition that lor marks as obvious is not the utterance itself, 
but its implication. Consider (23): 
 
23) B: Is John smart? 
a. A:  He is lor! He studied at MIT! 
b. A:  He is! He studied at MIT lor! 
 
Following our formal definition in (22), (23a) can be interpreted as conveying the proposition that 
it should be obvious to the hearer that John is smart. The next proposition – that John studied at 
MIT – functions as a justification using the following inferential relation:  
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24) Premise 1: John studied at MIT 
Premise 2: It should be obvious that everyone who studied at MIT is smart 
Implication: It should be obvious that John is smart 
 
However, even though lor is marking the second proposition instead of the first, (23b) does not 
seem to convey the fact that John studied at MIT is or should be obvious, but rather conveys the 
same proposition as (23a), i.e. that the previous proposition that John is smart should be obvious 
to the hearer. Whether the fact that John studied at MIT is obvious to the hearer or not does not 
seem to affect the acceptability of it being marked by lor. In (25), the marking of the proposition 
that John studied at MIT with lor is still acceptable, despite A’s opening line “He hasn’t told 
many people” implying that he believes the lor-marked proposition is a new one to B: 
 
25) B: Is John smart? 
A:  He is! He hasn’t told many people, but he actually studied at MIT lor! 
 
This poses a problem for models that characterise lor as marking the utterance that precedes it, as 
they would have to account for how the linguistic meaning of the particle can switch between 




From previous literature, the use of lor in CSE has been characterised variously as a marker for a 
directive or suggestion (Gupta 1992), a marker to signal ‘obviousness’ (Platt & Ho 1989) and a 
resignation marker (Wee 2002). However, the key concept of ‘obviousness’ is inadequately 
defined, and it is difficult to explain lor’s inability to mark direct imperatives and its predominant 
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use as an obviousness marker under the same theoretical framework. Lor’s acceptability in 
marking premises to convey an obvious implication cannot also be accounted for in any of the 
current characterisations. The following section will outline an alternative characterisation of lor 
that addresses these issues, and can account for each of the particle’s disparate functions under 
one unitary framework. 
 
3.2 A relevance-theoretic characterisation of lor 
 
Instead of the utterance that immediately precedes the particle lor, I propose that lor marks the 
immediately relevant proposition that is either indicated by the hearer’s prior question or 
determined by the speaker in the absence of prior context. Specifically, lor marks the immediately 
relevant proposition as being manifest in the hearer’s cognitive environment, and guarantees 
additional cognitive benefits through the recognition of manifestness that will offset the 
additional processing costs required. 
 
To illustrate, consider (1) (reproduced below as (26)): 
 
26) B: What do they sell at the market? 
a. Contextual assumption not immediately manifest to B:  
 Fish, vegetables, and meat are items commonly known to be sold in a market. 
b. A: Sell fish lor, vegetable lor, meat lor, all this lah. 
c. A: Sell fish, vegetable, meat, all this. 
 
In (26), B’s question to A implies that the common knowledge that fish, vegetables, and meat are 
items that are usually sold in a market is not immediately manifest to him. In response, A can 
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choose either (26b) or (26c) as an appropriate answer to B’s question. If A chooses (26c), B will 
add the new information supplied by A into his cognitive environment and the cognitive effect 
derived will be solely based on that addition. 
 
However, the particle lor in (26c) signals to B that A wants him to recognise that A’s answer is 
already manifest in his cognitive environment, and that this recognition will result in additional 
cognitive effects. Given our previous definition that a proposition can be manifest without 
actually being represented in a person’s mind, as long as it can be inferred from his other 
assumptions or by the hearer’s knowledge of the world (Sperber & Wilson 1995), a proposition 
may still be manifest to an individual even though she may be temporarily unable to access it. In 
this case, the derivation of A’s answer from manifest premises7 can be as follows: 
 
27) a. Contextual premise 1:  
Fish, vegetables, and meat are items commonly known to be sold in a market. 
b. Contextual premise 2:  
This market does not sell anything special.  
c. Contextual Implication:  
The market sells fish, vegetables, and meat. 
 
Since a hearer should have had no need to obtain from someone else an answer that is already 
manifest in her own cognitive environment, one of the main pragmatic effects of recognising the 
answer as manifest is to recognise the speaker’s indication that the answer is ‘obvious’, 
‘something which the speaker assumes the addressee to know already’, ‘something the addressee 
                                                     
7 (27a) is accepted to be common knowledge, and (27b) can be gathered based on contextual information during 
the exchange. 
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should know already’, etc., which accounts for the observation that lor is most often used to mark 
obviousness. Based on this recognition, the hearer can also derive additional cognitive effects 
such as recognising the speaker’s impatience or annoyance at the hearer that stems from him not 
knowing an obvious fact, etc. 
 
Together with obviousness, I propose that the different pragmatic functions of lor result from 
whether the premises of the lor-marked proposition are already accessible to the hearer, or 
whether the speaker supplies or highlights one of the premises to the hearer: 
 
a) Conveys a sense of obviousness – the immediately relevant proposition is either already 
present in the hearer’s cognitive environment, or can be derived from accessible premises 
b) Confirms the reliability/certainty of the immediately relevant proposition – only one of 
the contextual premises is accessible to the hearer, with the other premise supplied either 
before or after the immediately relevant proposition by the speaker herself 
 
Since a successful interpretation of lor will depend on whether the hearer can identify the 
contextual premises from which the immediately relevant proposition is manifest, the 
interpretation of lor will break down in the following situations: 
 
c) The hearer is unable to identify any contextual premise from which the immediately 
relevant proposition can be derived 
d) Recognising the immediately relevant proposition as relevant does not lead to additional 
cognitive benefits 
 
Each of these situations will be addressed in the subsequent sections. 
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3.2.1 Conveying a sense of obviousness 
 
Unlike in (27), in which the immediately relevant proposition can be derived from premises that 
are accessible to the hearer, lor can also be used to mark immediately relevant propositions that 
should themselves be accessible to the hearer, e.g. (28): 
 
28) B: What is 1 + 1? 
A: 2 lor. 
 
In (28), the immediately relevant proposition is a mathematical axiom, 1 + 1 = 2, and cannot be 
derived from any premises; however, this mathematical axiom is common knowledge and should 
be accessible to the hearer. A is therefore justified in using lor to indicate that her answer is 
already manifest in B’s cognitive environment, even though it appears to be temporarily 
inaccessible to B. The pragmatic function of lor here is to remind the hearer that the immediately 
relevant proposition is itself present in his cognitive environment, i.e. marking the proposition as 
‘obvious’. 
 
3.2.2 Confirming the reliability/certainty of the immediately relevant proposition 
 
Assuming (29) as the deductive relationship in which the immediately relevant proposition that 
John is smart can be derived, we find this characterisation of lor also predicts the unacceptability 
of (30). Since the hearer is unable to identify any contextual premise from which the immediately 
relevant proposition can be derived, he would be unable to recognise the immediately relevant 
proposition as manifest, much less derive additional cognitive benefits from the recognition: 
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29) Premise 1: John studied at MIT. 
Premise 2: It should be obvious that everyone who studied at MIT is smart. 
Implication: It should be obvious that John is smart. 
 
30) (B does not know where John studied at, or that MIT graduates are commonly 
supposed to be smart.) 
B: Is John smart? 
A: ? He is lor. 
 
However, if only one premise is accessible to the hearer prior to the exchange, the other one can 
be made accessible during the conversation itself by the speaker, allowing the hearer to then 
derive the immediately relevant proposition from both premises. For example, we noted 
previously that the hearer is not expected to know that John had come from MIT for lor to be 
used acceptably: 
 
31) (B does not know where John studied at, but knows that MIT graduates are commonly 
supposed to be smart.) 
B: Is John smart? 
a. A: ? He is lor. Everyone who studied at MIT is smart. 
b. A: He is lor. He hasn’t told many people, but he actually studied at MIT! 
 
32) (B knows where John studied at, but does not know that MIT graduates are commonly 
supposed to be smart.) 
B: Is John smart? 
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a. A: ? He is lor. He came from MIT.  
b. A: He is lor. Don’t you know that everyone who studied at MIT is smart? 
 
Since B can only construct the deductive relation (29) after A has supplied the missing premise in 
(31) and (32), it would be unreasonable for A to expect that the immediately relevant proposition 
should have been obvious to B. The pragmatic effect of recognising the immediately relevant 
proposition as manifest in these situations thus seems to be to confirm the reliability of the 
proposition. As (33) below shows, the premises of the immediately relevant proposition are taken 
to be certain or near-certain when lor is used: 
 
33) B: Is John smart? 
a. A: ? He is lor. I think he studied at MIT. (Uncertain premise.) 
b. A: He is lor. He studied at MIT! (Certain or near-certain premise.) 
 
Since the strength of a deductive implication follows the strength of the premises from which it is 
derived (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 110), the initially uncertain strength of the proposition “John is 
smart” automatically inherits the near-certainty of its premises once the hearer recognises the 
immediately relevant proposition as derivable from high-strength premises. 
 
3.2.3 Other additional cognitive benefits 
 
As lor guarantees to the hearer that recognising the manifestness of the immediately relevant 
proposition would bring additional cognitive benefits, the use of lor will fail if the hearer cannot 
derive any additional cognitive benefits from recognising the immediately relevant proposition as 
manifest. Consider (34): 
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34) B: What movie did you watch yesterday with your boyfriend? 
a. A: ? Love in Space lor. None of the other movies were available when we got there. 
b. A: Some crappy romcom [romantic comedy] lor. None of the other movies were 
available when we got there. 
 
If we characterise lor solely as a marker for manifestness, it would seem as though (34a) should 
be acceptable, since B should be able to derive the immediately relevant proposition, that A and 
her boyfriend watched Love in Space, according to the deductive relationship below: 
 
35) a. Stated Premise: No other movies besides Love in Space were available when A and 
her boyfriend got to the cinema. 
b. Accessible Premise: A and her boyfriend would watch a movie only if it was 
available. 
c.  Implication: A and her boyfriend watched Love in Space yesterday. 
 
However, our characterisation of lor involves a further restriction: the hearer should obtain 
additional cognitive benefits by recognising that the immediately relevant proposition is manifest 
in his cognitive environment. Although the immediately relevant proposition in (34a) is indeed 
manifest, it is unclear how recognising this contributes additional cognitive benefits to B – one of 
the premises from which the immediately relevant proposition is derived is not initially accessible 
to B, so A cannot use lor to indicate that the immediately relevant proposition is obvious; there is 
also no reason for B to doubt that A has indeed watched Love in Space the day before, so there is 
no need for A to use lor to strengthen her answer. Since the hearer obtains no additional cognitive 
benefits from recognising the manifestness of the immediately relevant proposition in (34a), its 
unacceptability is correctly accounted for. 
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If our characterisation of lor is to be consistent, then the acceptability of (34b) must be due to the 
fact that recognising the manifestness of the immediately relevant proposition “[We watched] 
some crappy romcom” contributes additional cognitive benefits that “[We watched] Love in 
Space” does not. Indeed, we find that there is an additional meaning behind (34b) – that of 
resignation. The following section will analyse the sense of resignation that Wee (2002) attributes 
to an inherent meaning of lor as the result of the hearer’s pragmatic processing in his search for 
additional cognitive benefits. 
 
3.2.3.1 Lor as a resignation marker 
 
Under the framework of relevance theory, utterances do not solely contain factual propositions 
but also the speaker’s attitude towards these propositions as higher-order explicatures (Sperber & 
Wilson 1988; Sperber & Wilson 1995). The deductive relationship conveyed by (34b) can more 
accurately be analysed as follows: 
 
36) a. Stated Premise: No other movies besides a bad comedy were available when A and 
her boyfriend got to the cinema. 
b. Accessible Premise: A and her boyfriend would watch a movie only if it was 
available. 
c.  Implication: A and her boyfriend watched a bad comedy yesterday. 
 Implication: A is unhappy about watching a bad comedy yesterday. 
 
Unlike Wee (2002), who attributes the resignative meaning conveyed by lor to a process of 
grammaticalisation, I argue that this resignative meaning is a result of general pragmatic 
processing that combines the recognition of manifestness that lor linguistically encodes and the 
negative emotional attitude that the speaker holds towards this manifestness. By way of 
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comparison, the following examples show how different emotional stances can be conveyed 
together with the recognition of manifestness: 
 
37) (A and B are talking about A taking care of her niece over the weekend) 
A: So for this weekend it's different because the parents intend to leave the the big big 
girl here. 
B: Orh. 
A: Good lor. [...] I mean we can play with her lor. 
B: So you've got entertainment. 
(adapted from ICE-SIN S1A-091) 
 
Immediately relevant proposition: It is good that A’s niece is staying with A over the 
weekend. 
Attitude of speaker: A is happy about having her niece over during the weekend. 
Pragmatic effect of lor: The immediately relevant proposition (and the speaker’s 
attitude towards it) is strengthened. 
 
38) B:  Didn’t John convert to vegetarianism some time back? 
A:  Yah. He says he’s vegetarian. But I see him eat meat sometimes lor. 
 
Immediately relevant proposition: John is not a vegetarian. 
Attitude of speaker: A disapproves of John eating meat while calling himself a 
vegetarian. 
Pragmatic effect of lor: The immediately relevant proposition (and the speaker’s 
attitude towards it) is strengthened. 
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39) B:  Have you got your visa done yet?  
A: Not yet! The university still hasn’t sent me my documents yet lor. 
 
Immediately relevant proposition: A has not applied for her visa yet. 
Attitude of speaker: A is frustrated over not receiving her documents from her 
university yet. 
Pragmatic effect of lor: A conveys that, though she would like to apply for her visa 
soon, she cannot do anything about it unless she receives her documents from her 
university. 
 
In all cases, lor instructs the hearer to recognise the immediately relevant proposition as manifest, 
and promises additional cognitive effects from this recognition. However, while lor confirms the 
certainty of the immediately relevant propositions in (37) and (38), it conveys a sense of 
resignation in (39). The difference between (39) and the previous two examples seems to be that 
the former conveys the speaker’s negative emotional stance towards the manifestness of the 
immediately relevant proposition. Lor therefore contributes additional cognitive benefits to the 
hearer by conveying, following Wee (2002), that the speaker is unhappy about the state of affairs 
that the immediately relevant proposition describes even though she recognises it as being a 
manifest conclusion that she is unable to change. Conversely, the desirability of changing the 
state of affairs described by the immediately relevant proposition is not implicated when the 
speaker feels positively towards the state of affairs in (37), or when the speaker’s negative 
attitude is not targeted towards the manifestness of the immediately relevant proposition in (38), 
and so the only pragmatic effect of lor in such cases would be to strengthen the immediately 
relevant proposition and the speaker’s attitude towards it if required. 
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To illustrate how the hearer interprets lor to recognise the speaker’s sense of resignation, consider 
(39) again: 
 
39) B:  Have you got your visa done yet?  
A: Not yet! The university still hasn’t sent me my documents yet lor. 
 
In (39), the immediately relevant proposition is A’s reply to B that she has not settled her visa for 
her overseas exchange yet, with the subsequent statement being a premise of the immediately 
relevant proposition (A has not settled her visa BECAUSE the university has not sent her her 
documents yet). The particle thus indicates to the hearer that the proposition that A has not settled 
her visa is manifest. However, as this proposition is only manifest to B because A has just 
supplied the premise that the university has not sent her her documents yet, B cannot interpret A’s 
use of lor as indicating that it should be obvious that she has not settled her visa. 
 
In trying to understand how A intends for his recognition that the immediately relevant 
proposition is manifest to supply additional cognitive benefits, the hearer also recognises that A is 
unhappy about this situation, which implies that she would prefer some other situation to be true 
instead. However, A also conveys her understanding that the possibility for these other situations 
to be true cannot follow from the stated premise (since only the immediately relevant proposition 
is manifest given the stated premise), and this understanding that nothing can be changed despite 
her unhappiness is interpreted by B as resignation. 
 
Conversely, the immediately relevant proposition in (37) is A’s assertion that it is good that her 
niece is staying with her over the weekend, with the subsequent statement being a premise of the 
immediately relevant proposition (It is good that A’s niece is staying with her over the weekend 
BECAUSE they can play with her). Since A is happy about this situation, the possibility of 
45 
desiring other situations is not implicated, and the hearer will not attempt to derive additional 
cognitive effects from that inferential route. Instead, the hearer will attempt to derive them by 
strengthening the immediately relevant proposition (as discussed in section 3.2.2). With the 
strengthening of the immediately relevant proposition, the attitude of the speaker – A is happy 
about having her niece over during the weekend – would be similarly strengthened. 
 
This analysis also explains why lor does not convey resignation in (38), even though the 
speaker’s attitude towards the lor-marked utterance is negative: 
 
38) B:  Didn’t John convert to vegetarianism some time back? 
A:  Yah. He says he’s vegetarian. But I see him eat meat sometimes lor. 
 
In (38), the immediately relevant proposition that is manifest is A’s assertion that John is not a 
vegetarian.  However, the hearer also recognises in this case that A is unhappy, not about the fact 
that John is not a vegetarian, but that he is still eating meat despite calling himself a vegetarian. 
Since A’s unhappiness is not due to the manifestness of the proposition indicated by lor, the 
hearer does not interpret lor in (38) as conveying resignation towards the manifest conclusion, but 
as strengthening the immediately relevant proposition that John is not a vegetarian (following the 




The characterisation of lor as a marker indicating that the immediately relevant proposition is 
manifest in the hearer’s cognitive environment also explains why lor cannot be used with direct 




40) A: Go home.  
a. Direct directive: Go home now! 
b. Advice: You should go home – there’s nothing to do here anyway. 
 
If (40) is interpreted as a direct imperative, the inferential relationship would roughly be as 
follows: 
 
41) (to B, who is A’s student) 
A: Go home! 
 
a. Encoded proposition:  
 It is potential and desirable to the speaker that the hearer goes home. 
b. Contextual assumption:  
 The speaker has authority over the hearer. 
c. Contextual Implication:  
 If the speaker has authority over the hearer, then the hearer should render the 
situation described by the imperative actual. 
d. Contextual Implication:  
 (Action: The hearer goes home.) 
 
Carston (2002) suggests that the propositional form of imperatives “seems to be functionally 
inert; the cognitive effects of an imperative utterance come from the interaction of its (higher 
level) explicatures with contextual assumptions” (133). The cognitive effect derived from direct 
imperatives is thus different from the cognitive effect from declaratives that have been discussed 
thus far – rather than the addition of an immediately relevant proposition into the hearer’s 
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cognitive environment, the cognitive effect of a direct imperative is the non-verbal action that the 
speaker wishes the hearer to perform. Since there is no immediately relevant proposition in a 
direct imperative that lor can mark, the particle is unable to be used with direct imperatives such 
as (41). 
 
However, the hearer can also interpret (41) according to (42) instead: 
 
42) Contextual premise:  
There is nothing to do here. 
Contextual premise:  
If there is nothing to do here, the hearer might as well go home. 
Contextual Implication:  
It is potential and desirable to the hearer that the hearer goes home. 
 
In (42), the cognitive effect that the hearer derives is not the action of going home, in the case of 
the direct imperative, but is the addition into his cognitive environment of the proposition 
encoded in the imperative itself – it is potential and desirable to the hearer that the hearer goes 
home. This proposition can thus be marked by lor as manifest, with additional cognitive benefits 
being derived from the strengthening of the piece of advice. 
 
The same analysis also applies to instructions and the granting of permission: 
 
43) B: What’s the fastest way to get to the train station from here? 




Contextual premise:  
Taxis are the fastest way of reaching most places in Singapore. 
Contextual premise:  
The train station is not at a location that is inconvenient for taxis. 
Contextual Implication added to B’s cognitive environment:  
It is potential and desirable to the hearer that he takes a taxi to the train station, given 
that he wants to get there as quickly as possible. 
 
44) B: Can I open the window? 
A: Open [it] lor.  
 
Contextual premise:  
The hearer can open the window if the speaker allows him to do so. 
Contextual premise:  
There is no reason for the speaker not to allow him to do so. 
Contextual Implication added to B’s cognitive environment:  
It is potential for the hearer that he opens the window. (Desirability is a given in this 
case.) 
 
In both cases, the contextual premises from which the immediately relevant propositions (or the 
propositions that are added to the hearer’s cognitive environment) are derived are assumed by the 
speaker to be accessible to the hearer, and so the pragmatic function of lor in these cases would 
be to mark the imperatives as being obvious. The restriction of lor to imperatives that describe 
state of affairs that are potential and desirable to the hearer also explains Gupta’s (1992) 
observation that lor marks directives or suggestions “apparently without expectation of 
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compliance” (43), as expectation of compliance is only present with imperatives that describe 




In this chapter, I proposed that the CSE speaker uses the particle lor when she wishes the hearer 
to recognise that the proposition immediately relevant to him is already manifest in his own 
cognitive environment. The speaker may intend this recognition to be relevant to the hearer in 
various ways: for instance, she may indicate the obviousness of the immediately relevant 
proposition in order to convey other contextual implications such as impatience, annoyance, etc., 
or highlight the relationship between the immediately relevant proposition and its premises to 
confirm the reliability of the proposition to the hearer. Rather than analysing lor as being 
polysemous between obviousness and resignation, I suggest here that the pragmatic effect of 
conveying resignation results from the interaction between the recognition of manifestness 
encoded by the particle and the speaker’s attitude towards the manifest situation, based on prior 
contextual cues as well as extralinguistic factors such as the speaker’s tone of voice, etc. 
 
In the next chapter, I will look at the hor particle, focusing on the interaction between the 




THE ‘HOR’ PARTICLE 
 
The CSE particle hor can be used with either a rising or falling tone. The former is commonly 
used to solicit agreement about the hor-marked utterance from the hearer, e.g.: 
 
1) (A and B are discussing the changes that have taken place on a particular street.)  
A: Last time don’t have shops hor? 
B: Mm hm.      (Marie 1988: 45) 
 
The latter is used in declaratives and imperatives. For imperatives, falling-tone hor weakens the 
tone from a strong order or command to a request, while for declaratives, hor seems to act as a 
reminder: 
 
2) (A and B are talking about their group project.)  
A: Remind me to tell Jim about the group meeting hor. 
B: Sure. No problem.     (Gan 2000: 36) 
 
3) A: This is my pencil hor. Don’t touch it. 
B: Okay.      (Kim & Wee 2009: 249) 
 
However, although one of the functions attributed to hor is to soften the force of imperatives, we 
see that the particle is unable to mark all imperatives: 
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4) a. A:  (to B) Give me $20 later hor. 
b. A: (to B) * Give me $20 now hor. 
c. A: (to B) Give me $20 now. 
 
In this chapter, I propose that hor encodes the proposition that the utterance preceding it is 
accessible to the hearer. Although the different pragmatic functions associated with each tone 
have led some researchers to conclude that there are two (or more) variants of hor (Gan 2000; 
Marie 1988), I attribute the difference between a rising-tone hor and a falling-tone hor to an 
interaction between the unitary meaning of hor and whether the entire utterance is a question or 
an imperative as signalled by the tone of the particle – the rising tone marks the proposition that 
the hor-marked proposition is accessible to the hearer as a thought that is desirable to either the 
speaker or hearer, while the falling tone marks the hearer’s accessibility of the hor-marked 
proposition as a situation that is desirable to the speaker. 
 
4.1 Previous characterisations of hor 
 
4.1.1 Hor (rising tone) as a marker to solicit agreement from hearer 
 
As stated previously, many researchers (Gan 2000; Gupta 1992; Kim & Wee 2009; Marie 1988; 
Wee 2004) have observed that hor, pronounced with a rising tone, can be used to solicit 
agreement about the hor-marked utterance from the hearer. Although the hearer can still express 
his disagreement with the hor-marked utterance, Kim and Wee (2009) demonstrate that questions 
marked with hor are indeed biased, conveying the speaker’s expectation of the hearer’s 
agreement. Using another CSE particle wat, a contradictory marker, they show that hor-marked 
questions imply the speaker’s belief that the hor-marked utterance is true: 
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5) (A and B are in a seafood restaurant.)  
A: This is lobster? 
a. B: Lobster wat. (Contradicts the implication that what A is referring to is not 
lobster) 
b.  B: Prawn wat. (Contradicts the implication that what A is referring to is lobster) 
(Kim & Wee 2009: 247) 
 
6) A: This is lobster hor? 
a. A: * Lobster wat. (Contradicts the implication that what A is referring to is not 
lobster) 
b.  A: Prawn wat. (Contradicts the implication that what A is referring to is lobster) 
(Kim & Wee 2009: 247) 
 
Since “This is lobster?” is an unbiased question, capable of implying either “This is lobster” or 
“This is not lobster”, wat can contradict either implication and thus both (5a) and (5b) are 
acceptable. However, only (6b) is acceptable as an answer to “This is lobster hor”, suggesting that 
the question only implies that what A is referring to is lobster. Kim and Wee thus concludes that 
when a speaker uses hor in a question, she assumes that the hor-marked utterance is true rather 
than false, and uses the question to solicit the hearer’s agreement. 
 
4.1.2 Hor (falling tone) as a marker to soften imperatives 
 
Both Marie (1988) and Gan (2000) characterise hor used in a falling tone as reducing the 
harshness of imperatives: 
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7) (In the photocopying room, the person in charge is telling the students to form a 
queue.)  
A: Stand in line hor.      (Marie 1988: 45) 
 
8) (A and B are talking about their group project.)  
A: Remind me to tell Jim about the group meeting hor. 
B: Sure. No problem.      (Gan 2000: 36) 
 
However, as stated previously, the particle is unable to mark all imperatives: 
 
9) a. A:  (to B) Give me $20 later hor. 
b. A: (to B) ? Give me $20 now hor. 
c. A: (to B) Give me $20 now. 
 
In (9), we find that hor is unable to mark imperatives that demand immediate compliance, i.e. 
imperatives that require the hearer to perform an immediate action. Looking back at previous 
imperatives that are documented as occurring with hor, it seems that they can be interpreted as 
either reminders that need not result in immediate compliance, or negative imperatives that 
similarly do not require an overt action to be performed: 
 
10) (In the photocopying room, the person in charge is telling the students to form a 
queue.) 
A: [I am reminding you that you should] Stand in line hor. (Marie 1988: 45) 
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11) (A and B are talking about their group project.)  
A: Remind me to tell Jim about the group meeting hor. 
B: Sure. No problem.    (Gan 2000: 36) 
 
12) A: This is my pencil hor. Don’t touch it. 
B: Okay.     (Kim & Wee 2009: 249) 
 
This observation also conflicts with Kim and Wee’s (2009) prediction that hor can be used to 
boost illocutionary force when the speaker has deontic authority over the hearer, e.g. in (13): 
 
13) (A sergeant is giving a command to a soldier of lower rank.)  
a. A: Stand in line hor.   (Kim & Wee 2009: 249) 
b. A: Stand in line. 
 
Although it is true that the utterance in (13a) does not seem to be a request, it also does not seem 
to be the case that it has greater illocutionary force than the bare imperative (13b). If the 
observation that hor can only mark reminders is true, (13a) will only be able to function as a 
strong reminder, whereas (13b) can demand immediate compliance. As such, “Stand in line hor” 
could never have greater illocutionary force than the bare imperative “Stand in line” even though 
the strong reminder might still function pragmatically as a demand given the greater deontic 
authority of the speaker.8 Since the latter claim seems to be more consistent with how (13a) is 
actually interpreted, an adequate characterisation of hor must be able to account for this 
observation. 
                                                     
8 (10) can be interpreted in a similar fashion, with the pragmatic demand for students to stand in line arising from 
the strong reminder to the students that they should stand in line. In contrast, (9b), which cannot be used with 
hor, cannot be interpreted as a reminder in any way. 
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4.1.3 Hor as a marker to garner support for a proposition 
 
Wee (2004) attempts to unify both rising tone and falling tone hor under a single meaning or 
function, i.e. an indication that the speaker is trying to garner support for the hor-marked 
proposition. For rising-tone hor, the speaker garners support for the hor-marked proposition by 
soliciting the hearer’s agreement; for falling tone hor, the speaker similarly attempts to solicit the 
hearer’s agreement to the request that is marked with the particle. 
 
Wee (2004) also includes under his unified meaning two other functions of hor highlighted by 
Gan (2000) – filler hor ((14)) and repair hor ((15)): 
 
14) (A, B and C are discussing when to schedule their group project meeting.)  
B: Tuesday should be fine right? 
C: Yes. 
A: If you all have no problems with Tuesday hor, then I will reschedule my tuition 
session. 
(Gan 2000: 37) 
 
15) (A and B are discussing a mutual friend.) 
A: That guy is always trying to take advantage of others. 
B: (no response) 
A: Hor? 
B:  Yah lor. Don’t bother about him. He will get his just desserts one day. 
(Gan 2000: 37) 
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Gan (2000) characterises filler hor as occurring at “an intonation break to signal the beginning of 
new information” (37). However, Wee points out that in (14), A can still be interpreted as trying 
to elicit agreement for the hor-marked proposition “You all have no problems with Tuesday”. 
Similarly, when a speaker uses hor to repair a lack of response from the hearer, Wee suggests that 
the particle is being used to elicit agreement for the proposition that was previously asserted by 
the speaker. 
 
Although Wee’s characterisation of hor attempts to reduce the various pragmatic functions of the 
particle into one function – garnering support for the hor-marked proposition – it is still unable to 
explain why the particle can only be used with reminders and negative imperatives such as in 
(10), (11) and (12) but not with a direct imperative or request such as in (9). In addition, 
describing the function of hor in some situations as attempting to garner support does not seem to 
be accurate: 
 
16) (A is telling B about her thoughts on death.)  
A: But I'm very frightened when people hor I I like I love. 
B: Uhm. 
A: In the family and things like that if they should die uh I find that harder to take. 
B: Oh. 
A: Than if I myself find that I'm terminally ill. (ICE-SIN S1A-028) 
 
17) A:  That guy hor, very stingy one.   (Gan 2000: 50) 
 
18) A: This is my pencil hor. Don’t touch it. 
B: Okay.      (Kim & Wee 2009: 249) 
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In (16) and (17), hor is used as a topic marker. Although one might argue that the speaker’s use 
of hor can be interpreted as attempting to garner support for the entire proposition, e.g. in (17), 
this does not explain why the particle is not placed at the end of the utterance instead if such is the 
case. It is also hard to describe hor’s function in (18) as garnering support for the proposition that 
the pencil A refers to is her own since this is a fact; rather, A in (18) seems to be reminding B of 
the hor-marked proposition in order to emphasise the validity of the subsequent imperative, i.e. 
that B should not touch A’s pencil. Even if we interpret hor in (18) as being used to garner 
support for the imperative, it is unclear why hor can be used in this case to garner support for a 
proposition it does not in fact mark. 
 
4.1.4 Hor as a marker to mark a non-standard discourse context 
 
Kim and Wee (2009) adopt Zeevat’s position (as cited in Kim & Wee 2009) that discourse 
particles are used in nonstandard discourse contexts9 to facilitate the successful transfer of beliefs 
between speaker and hearer. Specifically, they argue that hor marks “an asymmetry between 
speaker and hearer in terms of epistemic or deontic authority vis-à-vis a proposition” (250), and is 
used when the speaker wishes to check if the transfer of belief to the hearer through her utterance 
has been successful. When the speaker has the authority to evaluate the truth of the asserted 
proposition, the hor-marked proposition is interpreted as a strong assertion or demand; when the 
hearer has the authority to evaluate the truth of the asserted proposition, the hor-marked 
proposition is interpreted as a request or a question to solicit agreement. 
 
                                                     
9 Unlike in standard discourse contexts where the speaker can successfully transfer her belief to the hearer 
without opposition, nonstandard discourse contexts contain many factors, such as hearer expectations, that 
will affect the transfer of belief. In such contexts, the speaker must employ discourse strategies to facilitate 
the transfer of belief from speaker to hearer. 
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However, how hor is characterised in Kim and Wee’s (2009) framework seems to be problematic. 
When hor is used with declaratives, Kim and Wee characterise the particle as checking the 
successful transfer of the speaker’s belief to the hearer, which is hampered by the nonstandard 
discourse situation in which there is an asymmetry in epistemic authority between speaker and 
hearer (2009: 250). This transfer of the speaker’s belief in turn depends on its truth value – the 
hearer would not accept the speaker’s belief if he does not believe it to be true. Although the 
difficulty is apparent in situations when the hearer has epistemic authority, as the speaker will 
have to solicit the hearer’s agreement of the truth value of the speaker’s belief before it can be 
successfully transferred, the difficulty in situations when the speaker has epistemic authority is 
less clear. Since the hearer’s acceptance of the speaker’s belief depends on its truth value, there 
should be no reason for him to reject her belief when she has epistemic authority over it. 
Although Kim and Wee argue that the speaker will still need to check the successful transfer of 
her belief even if she has epistemic authority as “the hearer might have a proposition that 
conflicts or contradicts his proposition” (2009: 251), the unsuccessful transfer of beliefs would be 
a result of the hearer's existing propositions rather than the nonstandard discourse situation. 
 
One might suggest that in situations where the speaker has epistemic authority over the hearer, 
this authority is actually an advantage that she can remind the hearer of using hor in order to 
make him accept her belief. However, hor cannot be used acceptably in (19) to force the hearer to 
accept the speaker's belief: 
 
19) B: You're going for the party later right? 
A: ? No hor, I can't. 
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Similarly, if hor in imperatives is interpreted as an indication for the hearer to accept a given 
proposition and make it true given her greater deontic authority, then it is unclear why (20b) 
would be unacceptable as either a command or request while (20c) is acceptable. 
 
20) a. A:  (to B) Give me $20 later hor. 
b. A: (to B) ? Give me $20 now hor. 
c. A: (to B) Give me $20 now. 
 
Kim and Wee’s (2009) analysis also does not consider the intonation of the particle, although it 
seems to play an important role in the hearer’s interpretation of hor. Consider (21): 
 
21) (A text written by a group of girls is posted in a webpage. The text is full of words 
showing off how affluent they are and how their lifestyle is distinguished from that of 
ordinary people. After reading the text, a person left the following message.) 
A:  These people really too much hor. Someday, if I ever come across any of them, I 
will bite their high nose off. I very angry.  (Kim & Wee 2009: 254) 
 
Kim and Wee analyse hor in this case as overtly marking “that [A] has the full (in this case sole) 
authority to evaluate the truth of what he said [...]  and, consequently, makes it clear that potential 
hearers are expected to simply accept p. [...] In this context, hor is not interpreted as a question.” 
(2009: 254). Although (21) is a written message, if we imagine hor in this message to be 
pronounced with a rising pitch contour, it will be interpreted as soliciting agreement with other 
readers even though nothing else about the contextual situation has changed: 
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22) A:  These people really too much hor? Someday, if I ever come across any of them, I 
will bite their high nose off. I very angry. 
 
Although this might seem to merely refine Kim and Wee’s original argument, as intonation may 
act as a signal for whether it is the speaker or hearer who has epistemic authority when hor is 
used, I propose that intonation actually plays a different role in the hearer’s interpretation of hor. 
This issue will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.2.3.2. 
 
4.1.5 Hor as a marker for the hearer to focus on information presented 
 
Using a relevance-theoretic framework, Ler (2005) proposes that all CSE particles encode 
procedural meaning, i.e. they guide the hearer’s interpretation of the marked utterances by 
indicating that specific inferences be performed. Similar to Wee (2004), Ler characterises hor as a 
particle that “directs the hearer to focus on information presented and seeks the hearer’s positive 
response to the proposition” (212). However, Ler’s characterisation also suffers from the same 
issues as Wee (2004)’s, namely that utterances that are marked with hor do not always require the 
hearer’s positive response, and the propositions that do seek the hearer’s positive response need 




Given that hor exhibits distinct pragmatic functions determined by whether it is pronounced with 
a rising or falling tone, some researchers have characterised the particle as having two (or more) 
variants (Gan 2000; Marie 1988). Although other researchers (Kim & Wee 2009; Wee 2004) 
have analysed hor as having a unitary meaning despite the difference in tone, these accounts have 
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generally ignored the intonation of the particle and cannot explain why hor can only be attached 
to reminders and not all imperatives. The following section will outline an alternative 
characterisation of hor that maintains its unitary nature while addressing the empirical issues that 
affect previous accounts. 
 
4.2 A relevance-theoretic characterisation of hor 
 
Rather than analysing hor as garnering support or soliciting agreement, I propose that hor 
encodes the proposition that the utterance that precedes it is accessible to the hearer. An 
accessible proposition is defined as one that is easier to recall or access (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 
77) and therefore contributes to optimal relevance by reducing the hearer’s processing costs. The 
difference between a rising-tone hor and a falling-tone hor is attributed to the interaction between 
the unitary meaning of hor and whether the entire utterance is a question or an imperative 
respectively, as signalled by the tone of the particle – the rising tone marks the proposition that 
the hor-marked proposition is accessible to the hearer as a thought that is desirable to either the 
speaker or hearer, while the falling tone marks the hearer’s accessibility of the hor-marked 
proposition as a situation that is desirable to the speaker. 
 
4.2.1 Falling-tone hor 
 
As stated in the previous section, language data suggest that falling-tone hor converts imperatives 
and declaratives into (strong) reminders. In relevant-theoretic terms, for a proposition to be 
remembered, it must be kept accessible. As such, I propose that falling-tone hor functions as an 




To illustrate, consider (23): 
 
23) (A is telling B to get the local paper Today for her.)  
A: Get Today hor. 
B: Okay. Bye Bye.     (Ler 2005: 231) 
 
Although Ler (2005) analyses (23) as a direct imperative, i.e. A is requesting B to help her get a 
copy of Today, the difference between (24a) and (24b) shows that this cannot be the case: 
 
24) (A is telling B to get the local paper Today for her.)  
a. A: (expecting B to obey immediately) Get me Today. 
 B: (hands her the paper) Here. 
b. A: (expecting B to obey immediately) * Get me Today hor. 
 B: (hands her the paper) * Here. 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, imperatives are analysed as encoding descriptions of situations that are 
potential and desirable, i.e. (25a): 
 
25) (A is telling B to get the local paper Today for her.)  
A: Get Today. 
a. Encoded meaning: It is potential and desirable to A for B to get Today for her. 
b. Premise 1: A is B’s wife. 
Premise 2: If A is B’s wife, B will try to do what A desires to make her happy. 
Conclusion: (B gets Today for A.) 
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Whether B obeys A’s imperative will depend on how this description interacts with the other 
premises that B has in his cognitive environment. For example, if A is B’s wife, B would want to 
fulfil her desires in order to make her happy and so, given that it is desirable to A for B to get the 
paper for her, B would arrive at the conclusion that he should obey A and get her the paper. I 
propose that hor acts on the encoded proposition (25a), functioning as a reminder by instructing 
the hearer to keep the proposition accessible. As such, “Get Today hor” can no longer be 
interpreted as an imperative directing B to get the paper Today, but only as an imperative 
directing B to remember that A desires him to get the paper for her. Since the latter only requires 
a verbal response to indicate that the reminder has been received, rather than an action to be 
performed immediately, (27b) is thus unacceptable: 
 
26) A: Get Today. 
Encoded meaning: It is potential and desirable to A for B to get Today for her. 
B: (Obeys or ignores the imperative.) 
 
27) A: Get Today hor. 
 
p: It is potential and desirable to A for B to get Today for her. 
 
Encoded meaning: It is potential and desirable to A for B to keep p accessible in his 
cognitive environment. 
a. B: (Confirms or disproves whether p has been made accessible.) 
b. B: * (Obeys or ignores the imperative that p encodes.) 
 
This downgrading of the illocutionary force of hor-marked utterances from imperatives to 
reminders also explains how it functions pragmatically as a politeness device by softening 
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commands. In (23), the hor-marked request can no longer function as an imperative that 
commands B to get the paper for A, but merely serves to remind B of the action’s desirability to 
A. In this way, the particle shifts B’s motivation for acting on the imperative from A’s authority 
over B (as would be the case with a direct imperative) to A’s relationship with B. 
 
This characterisation of hor also accounts for how it can be used to justify or emphasise an 
imperative even when it is attached to the preceding declarative utterance, e.g. in (18), reproduced 
below as (28): 
 
28) A: This is my pencil hor. Don’t touch it. 
B: Okay.      (Kim & Wee 2009: 249) 
 
Following the analysis above, we see that the reminder the hor-marked declarative becomes in 
(28) serves as a premise that justifies the subsequent imperative – since this is A’s pencil, B 
should not touch it. 
 
4.2.2 Rising-tone hor 
 
While falling-tone hor functions as an instruction for the hearer to keep the hor-marked 
proposition accessible in her cognitive environment, rising-tone hor seems to function differently: 
 
21) (Internet chat room. Two male students are commenting on a fellow classmate, 
Michelle, who has just entered the tutorial room.) 
A:  So cute hor? 
B: Ya.       (Ler 2005: 227) 
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In (21), A does not seem to be asking B to keep the proposition that Michelle is cute accessible in 
his cognitive environment. As discussed in the previous section, he also does not seem to be 
asking B to ascertain or confirm conclusively whether Michelle is cute. Instead, I propose that A 
already believes that Michelle is cute, and is using hor to check if the proposition that Michelle is 
cute is similarly accessible to B, i.e. whether B also believes that Michelle is cute. 
 
This is similar to the checking function that both Gupta (1992) and Kim and Wee (2009) 
recognise in hor. However, there is a crucial difference between this characterisation and that of 
Kim and Wee: the latter checks for the successful transfer of the speaker's belief to the hearer or 
for the hearer's confirmation of the truth value for the belief, while the former merely checks for 
whether the hearer holds the same belief. As the contrast between (29a) and (29b) suggests, the 
characterisation of hor as a checking mechanism for the truth of a proposition may not be 
completely accurate: 
 
29) a. A: You’re at home now, right? 
 B: Ya. 
 A: I’ll come over and visit you then. 
b. A: ? You’re at home now hor? 
 B: Ya. 
 A: I’ll come over and visit you then. 
c. A: You’re at home now hor? Can I come over and collect something from you? 
 B: Okay. No problem. 
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Even though in both (29a) and (29b), the speaker checks with the hearer whether he is at home, 
(29a) seems to be relatively more natural than (29b). In contrast, the acceptability of (29c) as 
compared to (29b) shows that it is more acceptable for A to use the particle as a topic marker, 
paralleling its function in assertions such as (17):10 
 
17) A:  That guy hor, very stingy one.    (Gan 2000: 50) 
 
The differences between Kim and Wee’s (2009) characterisation of hor and mine will be covered 
in greater detail in section 4.2.4. 
 
4.2.3 Unitary meaning of hor 
 
Although it appears that rising-tone and falling-tone hor are separate particles, given their distinct 
functions, both are related to the accessibility of propositions. As such, I propose that the unitary 
meaning of hor is to mark a proposition as accessible. This meaning then interacts with the 
grammatical mood of the hor-marked utterance, as signalled by hor’s tone, to derive separate 
functions for rising-tone and falling-tone hor. 
 
4.2.3.1 Mood and intonation contour 
 
Although Halliday (1970) observes that in English, a falling intonation contour is associated with 
certainty and a rising contour with uncertainty (23), this relationship is not purely arbitrary. Clark 
                                                     
10 In line with this, I would argue that the examples in Kim and Wee (2009) that illustrate hor’s checking 
function are not true requests for epistemic confirmation, but introduce instead the hor-marked propositions 
(assumed to be true) as new topics of discourse.  
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and Lindsey (1990) suggest that aspects of intonational meaning are constant across languages 
(42), and Clark (1991) proposes that this universality can be accounted for if we posit an iconic 
aspect to intonational meaning – a rising tone can signal affective non-resolution as it is 
universally associated with tension in the speaker, while a falling tone can signal affective 
resolution as it is associated with a relaxed emotional state. The affective state of the speaker can 
in turn indicate the grammatical mood of her utterance, as illustrated in (30): 
 
30) (to B, pointing to the shelf)  
a. A: The box goes here. 
b. A: The box goes here? 
 
Relating intonation to (procedural) meaning, Clark proposes that a rising tone encodes the 
procedural constraint that the speaker is not entertaining the thought of which the proposition 
expressed is an interpretation (1991: 195). As such, an utterance with a rising tone will tend to be 
interpreted as a question – in (30b), A indicates that she has not accepted the thought that the box 
should be placed on the shelf, and would require the hearer to either confirm or disprove the truth 
of this proposition. Conversely, a falling tone encodes the procedural constraint that the speaker is 
entertaining the thought of which the proposition expressed is an interpretation (Clark 1991: 195), 
and thus an utterance with a falling tone will tend to be interpreted as a declarative or imperative 
– in (30a), A is certain that the proposition “The box should be placed on the shelf” is true, and is 
asserting it either as a fact or as a command or request to B. 
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4.2.3.2 Intonation of hor 
 
Since an utterance marked with rising-tone hor is interpreted as a question, the utterance that 
precedes it can either be a question ((31a)) or a proposition ((31b)): 
 
31) A: Michelle is so cute hor? 
a. A: * Michelle is so cute? 
b. A: Michelle is so cute. 
 
However, given that (31a) is unacceptable without hor, it is more likely that hor is attached not to 
questions but to declaratives, functioning in a way similar to tag questions: 
 
32) A: Michelle is so cute hor? 
a. A: Michelle is so cute, isn’t she? 
 
In support of this, we see that hor, like tag questions, retains its function even when it is detached 
from the preceding utterance: 
 
33) A: Michelle is so cute. Hor? 
a. A: Michelle is so cute. Isn’t she? 
 
Based on this, I assume in this chapter that the effect of a rising intonation applies to the larger 
utterance unit of hor and the proposition it refers to rather than applying independently to the 
latter like (31a) would suggest. 
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4.2.3.3 Rising-tone hor 
 
When hor is used with a rising intonation at sentence-final position, I propose that the hearer 
interprets it as marking a question that tells the hearer to acknowledge whether the hor-marked 
proposition is accessible in his cognitive environment. 
 
34) (Internet chat room. Two male students are commenting on a fellow classmate, 
Michelle, who has just entered the tutorial room.) 
A:  So cute hor? 
B: Ya.      (Ler 2005: 227) 
 
 p : [Michelle is] so cute. 
 
a. Unitary meaning of hor: p is accessible. 
b. Meaning of rising-tone hor: The thought that [p is accessible] is desirable/relevant 
to the speaker if true. 
 
In (21), reproduced as (34), A uses hor with a rising intonation to check if B agrees with him on 
the hor-marked utterance. Without taking intonation into account, hor marks a proposition as 
being accessible; the rising intonation then indicates that the thought that the given proposition p 
is accessible (to B) is interpreted as being desirable or relevant to the speaker if true. However, 
since A does not know whether the proposition that Michelle is cute is accessible to B unless B 
tells him so, B would have to acknowledge whether the proposition is accessible in his cognitive 
environment, or if it is not, whether it is in fact true. 
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For sentence-medial hor, the particle still marks a desirable thought, but rather than being 
desirable to the speaker, it is desirable to the hearer. However, rather than deriving relevance 
from the thought that p is accessible, I propose that the hearer derives relevance from the 
checking of p’s accessibility itself. This is similar to the use of the question “Remember Tom?” 
in (35): 
 
35) Remember Tom? Well, he’s just bought a motorbike. (Blakemore 2002: 131) 
 
In (35), the question conveys to the hearer that the thought that the hearer remembers Tom is 
desirable either to the speaker or the hearer. If the thought is desirable to the speaker, the question 
will act as a request for the hearer to provide some evidence to the speaker to either support or 
disprove the proposition. However, the fact that the speaker continues directly with her next point 
without waiting for the hearer’s answer suggests that the thought is desirable not to the speaker 
but to the hearer. Through the question, the speaker intends the memory of Tom (together with 
other associated memories) to become accessible to the hearer as he ascertains the truth value of 
the question. This thus reduces to a minimum the processing costs required for the hearer to 
process the next utterance “Well, he’s just bought a motorbike” in the context of his existing 
knowledge of Tim, thereby achieving optimal relevance for the hearer. 
 
The use of hor in (17) and (29) (reproduced as (36) and (37) respectively) can be analysed in a 
similar way: 
 
36) A:  That guy hor, very stingy one.    (Gan 2000: 50) 
 
p : [There is] that guy. 
 
a. Unitary meaning of hor: p is accessible. 
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b. Meaning of rising-tone hor: The thought that [p is accessible] is desirable/relevant 
to the hearer if true. 
 
37) a. A: You’re at home now, right? 
 B: Ya. 
 A: I’ll come over and visit you then. 
b. A: ? You’re at home now hor? 
 B: Ya. 
 A: I’ll come over and visit you then. 
c. A: You’re at home now hor? Can I come over and collect something from you? 
 B: Okay. No problem. 
 
In ascertaining whether the proposition “There is this guy” in (36) is accessible, the hearer causes 
assumptions about the man to become accessible, providing the contextual information required 
to process the subsequent utterance “very stingy”. Rising-tone hor’s function as a topic marker is 
thus accounted for, as the particle effectively instructs the hearer to process the hor-marked 
utterance as contextual information for the following utterance. In (37), the proposition that the 
speaker makes accessible to the hearer is the assumed fact that he is at home, which provides 
relevance as contextual information for the speaker’s main intention, which is a request to collect 
something from the hearer. 
 
This analysis is similar to Kim and Wee’s (2009) analysis of ‘filler’ hor as a checking mechanism 
for the speaker “to make sure that the  hearer’s  mental representation is at least partially similar 
to that of the speaker’s before continuing with the rest of the utterance” (258). However, it is 
important to note that this checking function is inconsistent with Kim and Wee’s overall 
characterisation of hor, as it is unclear what belief is meant to be transferred by ‘filler’ hor, which 
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occurs in between a full proposition, or why the speaker would need to assert her epistemic 
authority over its truth value. Again, this issue will be elaborated upon in section 4.2.4. 
 
4.2.3.4 Falling-tone hor 
 
When hor is used with a falling tone, I propose that the hearer interprets the falling tone as 
marking an imperative that instructs the hearer to make the hor-marked proposition accessible in 
his cognitive environment.  
 
38) A: This is my pencil hor. Don’t touch it. 
B: Okay.      (Kim & Wee 2009: 249) 
 
p : This is A’s pencil. 
 
a. Unitary meaning of hor: p is accessible. 
b. Meaning of falling-tone hor: It is potential and desirable to the speaker that [p is 
accessible]. 
 
In (28), reproduced as (38), A uses hor with a falling tone to remind B that the pencil that she is 
referring to is hers, so B should not touch it. Without taking tone into account, hor marks a 
proposition as being accessible. Although in this case the utterance that precedes hor takes a 
falling intonation as well, I would assume for consistency that the effect of the falling intonation 
similarly applies to the larger utterance unit of hor and the proposition it refers to, and so the 
falling intonation indicates that the description that a given proposition p is accessible is 
interpreted as a potential state of affairs that the speaker desires the hearer to make actual. If the 
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hearer obeys this imperative, he will make p accessible in his cognitive environment or, if it is 
already accessible, keep p accessible. 
 
4.2.4 Comparison with other characterisations of hor 
 
4.2.4.1 Ler (2005) 
 
Although Ler (2005) also attempts to separate hor’s core meaning from its pragmatic functions 
using a relevant-theoretic approach, the functions of hor that she claims are encoded in the 
particle can be analysed as secondary results that follow from the core meaning proposed in this 
chapter. As highlighted previously, garnering support (Wee 2004) or soliciting the hearer’s 
positive response (Ler 2005) cannot solely make up hor’s core meaning as they cannot account 
for the particle’s function as a topic marker, which does not require a response or support from 
the hearer. Instead, the characterisation in this chapter accounts for both functions – the utterance 
will require a response from the hearer when the hor-marked proposition is interpreted as a 
desirable thought that is relevant to the speaker, and will function as a topic marker when the hor-
marked proposition is interpreted as a desirable thought that is relevant to the hearer instead. 
 
Since the hearer will have to focus on the information presented by the speaker in order to 
determine if it is accessible in his cognitive environment, the instruction to focus on information 
presented that Ler (2005) proposes as part of the particle’s core meaning can also follow from 
hor’s checking function instead. In support of this, we see that a speaker cannot use the particle 
solely to draw the hearer’s attention towards something, but has to use it to introduce a topic: 
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39) a. A:  (pointing at a bird) ? Look! There’s a pretty bird over there hor? 
 B: Ya. 
b. A:  (pointing at a bird) Look! The bird over there is pretty hor? 
 B: Ya. 
 A: I remember there used to be many birds like that around. I wonder where all of 
them went. 
 
4.2.4.2 Kim and Wee (2009) 
 
The distinction between Kim and Wee’s (2009) analysis and mine is harder to draw, as both 
characterise hor as being involved in matching the speaker’s and hearer’s mental representations 
– Kim and Wee propose that it conveys a request from the speaker to confirm that he has the 
same mental representation as her, while I propose that it either checks that a specific proposition 
is accessible in the hearer’s cognitive environment or imposes a proposition instead. However, 
while Kim and Wee (2009) argue that hor itself marks an asymmetry in epistemic and deontic 
authority between speaker and hearer, I propose that it is the intonation of the particle that signals 
the modality of the entire utterance as either a question or an imperative, which in turn reflects the 
epistemic or deontic asymmetry observed by Kim and Wee (2009). When hor is used with a 
rising intonation, the hearer interprets it as a question, which would indicate the hearer as having 
greater epistemic authority; when hor is used with a falling intonation, the hearer interprets it as 
an imperative, which would indicate the speaker has greater epistemic or deontic authority. In this 
way, the two dimensions of epistemic and deontic authority that hor marks in Kim and Wee’s 
characterisation are reduced to one dimension: whether the speaker imposes a proposition onto 
the hearer’s cognitive environment or not. 
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In addition, while Kim and Wee (2009) analyse hor’s checking function as facilitating the 
successful transfer of belief between speaker and hearer, these two functions do not always go 
together when hor is used. When the particle is used as a topic marker, for example, the speaker 
checks for whether the hearer accesses the desired mental representation that serves as context for 
her subsequent utterance, but does not seem to transfer any belief directly through the hor-marked 
utterance. How falling-tone hor is used with declaratives and imperatives also seems to suggest 
an additional function of reminding the hearer rather than merely facilitating the transfer of the 
speaker’s belief, as evidenced by the contrasts in (20) (reproduced below as (40)) and (41). 
 
40) a. A:  (to B) Give me $20 later hor. 
b. A: (to B) ? Give me $20 now hor. 
c. A: (to B) Give me $20 now. 
 
41) B: You're going for the party later right? 
a. A: ? No hor, I can't. 
b. A: No hor. So don’t expect me to drive you home afterwards. 
 
In both cases, the unacceptability of hor can be accounted for if we characterise its function as 
indicating that the hearer should keep the hor-marked proposition accessible in his cognitive 
environment. As the hearer interprets the particle pragmatically as a reminder, it will be unable to 
increase the force of a direct imperative in (40b), or express the speaker’s strong commitment of 
the hor-marked utterance in (41); in support of this, (41b), in which the hor-marked utterance 





This chapter has proposed that rather than being two separate particles, rising-tone and falling-
tone hor can be analysed as having a single core meaning that interacts with intonation to result in 
its different pragmatic functions. The core meaning of hor, which is that the proposition it marks 
is accessible in the hearer’s cognitive environment, can either be interpreted as describing a 
desirable situation that the hearer has to make actual when the particle is pronounced with a 
falling intonation, or as describing a desirable thought that is relevant to either the speaker or 
hearer when it is pronounced with a rising intonation. In the former case, the hor-marked 
utterance functions as a strong reminder, while in the latter case, it functions as either a check of 
the hor-marked proposition’s accessibility to the hearer or a topic marker that makes the hor-
marked proposition accessible to the hearer. 
 
The chapter has also introduced the concept of intonation as an indicator of an utterance’s 
modality, and has shown that the modality of an utterance can affect its pragmatic meaning. In the 
next chapter, this concept of tone will be used to account for the multiple pragmatic functions of 




THE ‘LAH’ PARTICLE 
 
The CSE particle lah has perhaps been the most difficult to characterise given the wide range of 
pragmatic functions that has been attributed to it. For instance, lah can be used to lend emphasis 
to utterances, e.g.: 
 
1) A: Do you want to go? I’m not going lah. 
 (I emphasise to you that I’m not going.)   (Kwan-Terry 1992: 69) 
 
However, lah can also serve to soften the force of utterances, or mark as salient the close social 
relationship between speaker and hearer: 
 
2) A: Come with us lah.  
 (Won’t you come with us?)  
(Oxford English Dictionary online, as cited in Ler 2006: 156) 
 
3) A: No use trying to hide our roots lah.  
 (As one Singaporean to another, there is no use in trying to hide our roots.)  
(Ler 2006: 155) 
 
Like the particle hor, these functions, among others, have been observed to correspond with 
specific pitches with which lah is pronounced, and this has similarly led some researchers (Bell & 
Ser 1983; Kwan-Terry 1978; Wong 2004) to conclude that there are different variants of the 
78 
particle, each with its own pragmatic function. However, I propose instead that the core function 
of lah is to emphasise the truth value of the lah-marked proposition, and that the different 
pragmatic functions that other researchers argue are inherent to the particle, e.g. emphasising 
solidarity or softening the impoliteness of an utterance, result from this core function of lah 
interacting with the modality of the utterance, which is signalled through the tone of the particle. 
 
5.1 Previous characterisations of lah 
 
5.1.1 Lah as a marker to indicate social relationships 
 
Richards and Tay (1977) observe that lah can be used in various types of speech acts, “provided 
that there is a positive rapport between speakers and an element of solidarity” (145). For example, 
lah would not be used in situations where the speaker and hearer are strangers, or when one party 
is in a subordinate relationship to the other. As such, they propose that lah is not tied to a specific 
speech act or meaning, but is a code marker that identifies “rapport, solidarity, familiarity and 
informality” (146) between the speaker and hearer. This information about the situational context 
of the speech act can therefore contribute towards pragmatic effects such as softening the severity 
of a command. 
 
While Richards and Tay (1977) posit lah as a unitary marker that indicates solidarity, both Bell 
and Ser (1983) and Kwan-Terry (1978) argue that there are two forms of lah that differ in 
phonological stress, one indicating social intimacy between the participants of the speech act and 
the other indicating social distance. By highlighting the social closeness between speaker and 
hearer, potentially confrontational utterances from the speaker can be softened, resulting in an 
attenuation of illocutionary force. However, while Kwan-Terry (1978) believes that it is the 
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stressed lah that may be used to convey “a certain softening of tone or attitude” (23), Bell and Ser 
(1983) believe that it is the unstressed or contracted lah that “‘softens’ the meaning of the 
utterance, [and] introduces a degree of ‘warmth’ into the interaction” (14).  
 
Although it is true that lah conveys a sense of social closeness in some situations, this is not the 
only function of the particle. (4) illustrates lah’s pragmatic function of indicating obviousness, 
which has been observed by many researchers (e.g. Kwan-Terry (1978), Pakir (1992), Wong 
(2004)): 
 
4) B:  What is 2 + 2? 
A: 4 lah! 
 
In (4), A is conveying a sense that the answer should have been obvious to B, with an attendant 
emotional stance of impatience or annoyance, and so it is hard to analyse lah as indicating 
solidarity or social closeness in this case. Lah cannot therefore be solely a marker to indicate the 
social relationship between speaker and hearer but must have some other semantic meaning. 
 
5.1.2 Lah as an assertive marker 
 
In her paper, Kwan-Terry (1978) seems to draw a distinction between emphasising the firmness 
of tone or attitude (which is attributed to unstressed lah) and the truth of the utterance (attributed 
to stressed lah). Even though she argues that the stressed form of lah softens the tone or attitude 
of the utterance, it may also be used to “express emphasis, though the emphatic meaning is 
usually modified in meaning according to the context” (Kwan-Terry 1978: 22). For example, A 
uses lah in (5) to emphasise the truth of her utterance, indicating that it should be obvious to B 
that she should wear an evening dress for the evening event. 
80 
 
5) B: What should I wear this evening? 
A:  Evening dress lah.     (Kwan-Terry 1978: 23) 
 
This function of lah to indicate the speaker’s commitment towards her utterance is elaborated 
upon by Gupta (1992). Gupta argues that on the scale of assertiveness she developed to account 
for all CSE particles, lah “covers the full range within the assertive continuum” (42), appearing in 
directives, statements and negations: 
 
Directives: 
6) B:  (to A) Okay, let’s go to in your house down there. 
A:  Ask your mummy first lah.   (Gupta 1992: 42) 
 
Statements: 
7) A:  The divorce [interview was] just finished. 
B:  How was the divorce one? 
A: I don't know lah but you know [it’s] very depressing lah. (ICE-SIN S1A-022) 
 
Negations: 
8) B: Should we call her? Ask her [to] buy some [food] and come [over]? 
A:  No lah no lah.  
B: No ah? 




However, Gupta’s characterisation of CSE particles on a single dimension of assertiveness seems 
to be too general: 
 
9) a. (A and B are in a museum) 
 A: (pointing at a painting) This is nice! 
 B: Yes, I think so too! 
b. A: (to B) ? This is nice lah! 
 B: * Yes, I think so too! 
 
10) a. A: (to B) Are you mad? 
b. A: (to B) ? Are you mad lah? / ? Are you mad lah! 
c. A: (to A’s mother) Why [can’t I go to Amanda’s house] lah? 
 
Given that lah indicates the speaker’s commitment towards her utterance, (9b) should be 
acceptable, since the speaker is using lah to express her commitment to her opinion of the 
painting. Similarly, although Gupta (1992) shows that (10c) is acceptable as a rhetorical question 
in which A criticises his mother’s refusal to allow him to visit his friend Amanda, lah is unable to 
mark another rhetorical question in (10b). These contrasts are unaccounted for by both Kwan-
Terry’s (1978) and Gupta’s (1992) characterisations of lah. 
 
The unacceptability of (9b) seems to suggest that lah cannot be used when the hearer is in 
agreement with the speaker, and this oppositional aspect of lah is captured by Wong (2004) in his 
characterisation of the particle. He proposes that lah is used when the speaker wishes to change 
the mind of the hearer, and characterises the underlying core meaning of lah as a request for the 
hearer to agree with the speaker’s lah-marked assertion. Wong (2004) analyses three forms of 
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lah11 in his study, characterised by their lexical tone and differing in their pragmatic effect – la3 is 
the most impositional as the speaker aims to impose her own view on the hearer, while la2 is used 
when the speaker aims to persuade the hearer “without excessive pressure” (773), and la4 conveys 
a sense that the speaker’s view should have been obvious to the hearer. 
 
However, Wong’s characterisation of lah is unable to account for situations when the hearer does 
not actually disagree with the lah-marked utterance, e.g. (11): 
 
11) A: Maybe he goes to the park when he's free? 
B: He's got kidney problem and carries a bag around. 
A: So he cannot go anywhere lah.    (Wong 2004: 769) 
 
Wong (2004) describes lah as encoding the following meaning: 
 
He cannot go anywhere la4 = 
I think something now (= I know he cannot go anywhere) 
I think you don't think like this 
I think you could have thought like this before 
I think it will be good if you think like this 
I think if I say something, you can think like this 
I say it now (“he cannot go anywhere”) 
 
                                                     
11 As noted in Chapter 1, Wong (2004) leaves out one variant of lah in his study as it is rarely used relative to the 
other three variants. However, this variant will be covered in Section 1.4 in this chapter. 
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This speaker gathers from the previous speaker that the person spoken of cannot go anywhere 
because of a kidney problem. He then makes this explicit to seek confirmation 
(Wong 2004: 770). 
 
The characterisation of lah in (11) is problematic as it supposes that the speaker (A) believes the 
hearer (B) does not think that “[the person spoken of] cannot go anywhere”. However, this would 
be incorrect as A explicitly seeks confirmation from B on this fact. Wong (2004) attempts to 
address this by proposing that “there is a component I know and if we posit this as the ‘unspoken’ 
component, the apparent discrepancy can be reconciled” (769). Despite this, even if we assume 
that A believes B does not think that “A knows [the person spoken of] cannot go anywhere”, and 
uses the utterance “he cannot go anywhere lah” to change B's mind, this would still be awkward 
as the pragmatic function of the utterance is to “seek confirmation” about whether the person 
spoken of can move about freely with a kidney problem, not to change B's mind about whether A 
knows this or not. Since all three lahs encode the speech act of assertion (with varying nuances), 
it is unclear how the pragmatic function of seeking confirmation can be conveyed in the first 
place. 
 
5.1.3 Lah as an accommodation marker 
 
Like Wong (2004), Besemeres and Wierzbicka (2003) use a Natural Semantic Metalanguage 
(NSM) framework in their characterisation of lah. However, they propose that lah indicates the 
speaker’s expectation that the hearer is able to understand her rather than directly asserting a 
proposition, and derive the different pragmatic functions of lah from this unitary semantic 
meaning. For example, they suggest that when the hearer does not seem to be able to understand 
the speaker, the speaker’s use of lah to highlight his expectation that the hearer should be able to 
understand her can be interpreted by the hearer as a plea for understanding, accounting for how 
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lah-marked utterances can seem to be ‘pleading’ (21); alternatively, the speaker may also convey 
her disapproval of the fact that the hearer does not seem to be able to understand her even though 
she should, causing lah to sound ‘impatient’ (22). 
 
Ler’s (2005; 2006) characterisation of lah is similar to that of Besemeres and Wierzbicka (2003), 
although she approaches it from a relevance-theoretic perspective. While Besemeres and 
Wierzbicka (2003) argue that lah indicates the speaker’s expectation that the hearer is able to 
understand her utterance, Ler proposes that lah is used to highlight a shared contextual 
assumption that the hearer is expected to access and accommodate in order to derive optimal 
relevance from the lah-marked utterance. Since the hearer must understand an utterance in order 
to derive optimal relevance from it, Ler’s characterisation of lah can be seen as an elaboration of 
how the speaker expects the hearer to be able to understand her utterance in the first place, i.e. by 
accessing and accommodating a shared contextual assumption that is not explicitly stated. 
 
One issue that Besemeres and Wierzbicka (2003) have regarding previous characterisations of lah 
is their vagueness and untestability (18), and in comparison, they claim that their characterisation 
is “testable through substitution in context”. However, their characterisation of lah (and also 
Ler’s (2005; 2006) characterisation of lah) is still unable to account for the unacceptability of the 
previously raised (9b) and (10b) (reproduced as (12b) and (13b) below): 
 
12) a. (A and B are in a museum) 
 A: (pointing at a painting) This is nice! 
 B: Yes, I think so too! 
b. A: (to B) ? This is nice lah! 
 B: * Yes, I think so too! 
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13) a. A: (to B) Are you mad? 
b. A: (to B) ? Are you mad lah? / ? Are you mad lah! 
c. A: (to A’s mother) Why [can’t I go to Amanda’s house] lah? 
 
If we interpret A’s use of lah in (12b) as indicating to B that he should be able to understand why 
she likes the painting (maybe because it is very well-painted, or because she likes the subject of 
the painting) or as indicating that B should access and accommodate the previous reasons as 
shared assumptions, there is no reason why either A’s use of lah to mark her praise of the 
painting, or her wish for B to agree with her, should be unacceptable. Similarly, given that lah 
can be used in (13c) to indicate to A’s mother his frustration at not being able to visit his friend 
Amanda, it is unclear why lah cannot be used in (13b) to convey A’s displeasure at B’s 
irrationality. 
 
5.1.4 Lah as an enumerative marker 
 
Richards and Tay (1977) noted that lah in Hokkien can be used to mark enumeration, e.g.: 
 
14) kè-nî gê sî-chueh tak-gê si thâi koe lah, thâi ah lah, bóe ti-kha lah, bóe bah lah. 
(At New Year time, everyone kills chicken lah, kills duck lah, buys pigs’ trotters lah, 
buys pork lah.)     (Richards & Tay 1977: 151) 
 
Although they did not explicitly recognise CSE lah as having this function as well, my informal 
respondents as well as my own intuitions of CSE agree that CSE lah can similarly be used to 
mark items on a list. However, this function of lah is curiously absent in characterisations of the 
particle, and cannot be accounted for by either Ler (2005, 2006), Besemeres and Wierzbicka 
(2003) or Wong (2004) – it is unclear what shared assumption the speaker is highlighting to the 
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hearer, or why the speaker has to indicate that the hearer can understand that people perform such 
actions during the New Year; the speaker is also not attempting to convince the hearer about 




As Ler (2005) points out, previous characterisations of lah focus on different aspects and 
functions of the particle, which may not overlap or may even be contradictory (68). For instance, 
although the functions of lah cover both epistemic and social dimensions, Gupta’s (1992; 2006) 
characterisation of lah as a marker for epistemic modality and Wong’s (2004) characterisation of 
lah as an assertion marker neglect lah’s social function of marking solidarity and rapport. Unitary 
characterisations of lah also ignore the relationship between the particle’s intonation and 
pragmatic function. Another issue with unitary approaches is that they tend to be too general 
(Besemeres & Wierzbicka 2003; Gupta 1992; Ler 2005; Ler 2006) and are unable to account for 
some unacceptable uses of lah. The following section will argue for a unitary characterisation of 
lah, but will introduce the effect of modality, as signalled by intonation, into the analysis. 
 
5.2 A relevant-theoretic characterisation of lah 
 
5.2.1 Lah as an indicator of high strength 
 
One of the pragmatic functions of lah that is commonly documented is persuasion (Besemeres & 
Wierzbicka 2003; Kwan-Terry 1978; Ler 2006; Loke & Low 1988; Wong 2004): 
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15) B: Are you going to the party tomorrow? 
a. A:  I cannot make it. Sorry. (I may have no good reason for missing the party.) 
b. A: I cannot make it lah. Sorry. (I am missing the party because of a very good 
reason.) 
 
In (15b), A seems to be using lah to persuade B that she cannot make it to the party. More 
specifically, the difference between (15a) and (15b) seems to be that (15a) leaves open the 
possibility that A has no justifiable reason for missing the party, while (15b) suggests that A has a 
good reason for doing so. In fact, it is common for a lah-marked negation to be followed by the 
reason for the negation (which is underlined):  
 
16) a. (A is hoping to stay over at a friend’s house when she goes overseas, but decided 
not to due to space constraints.) 
A: But two of them are staying one uhm me and another colleague ... And if the 
wife goes they only have two rooms. 
B: Oh. 
A: So I think no lah too many people around.  (ICE-SIN S1A-016) 
b. (A is inviting B to watch the musical Phantom of the Opera.) 
 A: So do you want to go or not? You don't want to go Phantom of the Opera? 
 B: No lah. I I really want to go but you know I... (unclear word)  
(ICE-SIN S1A-097) 
 
In relevance-theoretic terms, when a speaker uses lah to mark persuasive utterances, she is trying 
to convince the hearer of the reliability of her utterances, i.e. to increase the hearer’s assessment 
of the strength of the proposition(s) asserted. As such, I propose that the procedural meaning 
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encoded by lah is an indication to the hearer that the lah-marked proposition is high-strength. To 
illustrate, (15b) can be analysed as the inferential relation (17): 
 
17) a. Premise 1: If A has something on at the time of the party, A cannot go for the party. 
b. Premise 2: A has something on at the time of the party. 
c. Conclusion: A cannot go for the party. 
 
Using lah, A indicates to B that (17c) is high-strength; if B accepts A’s assertion, B would have 
to assume that both (17a) and (17b) are high-strength, as the strength of a deductive implication 
takes the strength of the premises from which it is derived (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 110). As 
such, B would either have to take (17b) on trust, or A would have to confirm that the premise of 
the lah-marked proposition is high-strength by highlighting it such as in (16). 
 
However, this explanation is still not enough to explain why (18b) is awkward while (18c) is 
acceptable: 
 
18) a. A: (to B) This [painting] is nice! 
b. A: (to B) ? This [painting] is nice lah! 
c. A: (trying to convince B) This [painting] is nice lah! I can’t see why you don’t like 
it – I think it’s absolutely perfect! 
 
The contrast between (18b) and (18c) can be accounted for when we recall the concept of optimal 
relevance – it is not enough for the hearer to derive maximum cognitive benefits, as the speaker 
can just elaborate on her utterance endlessly, but the cognitive benefits to be derived must not 
require more cognitive effort than they are worth. (18c) is therefore acceptable as the additional 
cognitive effort required by B to process lah is rewarded by a potential increase in the strength of 
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the asserted proposition, since A may succeed in convincing B that the painting is a good one. 
However, if B is already prepared to take A’s assertion as certain, then the additional cognitive 
effort in processing lah is not justified by the benefits obtained (since the proposition “This 
painting is nice” would be high-strength anyway) and so lah would violate the presumption of 
optimal relevance in this case. This restriction therefore explains why lah is most often used when 
the speaker believes the hearer to disagree with her utterance or hold the opposite view, as it is an 
indication for the hearer to increase the low strength that he would otherwise assign to her 
utterance. 
 
Although the speaker may use lah to indicate to the hearer that the lah-marked proposition should 
be taken to be of high strength, whether the strength of the proposition is in fact revised depends 
on the hearer. From the hearer’s perspective, the revision may be motivated by subsequent 
utterances by the speaker that may justify the high strength of the lah-marked proposition, but 
another important factor would be the speaker’s relationship with the hearer. For instance, 
consider (19): 
 
19) A: Quite nice lah. (I’m your friend; consider my opinion.) (Ler 2006: 156) 
 
p: [It is] quite nice. 
 
In (19), A uses lah to indicate to B that the proposition p is of high strength. In order to decide 
whether or not to revise p, B may consider factors such as A’s general reliability, but may also 
take into account his relationship with A – in this case, Ler suggests that the fact that A is B’s 
friend is an important factor that determines whether B accepts A’s opinion. Although the 
speaker’s authority might be another motivating factor for the hearer to revise the strength of the 
lah-marked proposition, lah is not often used when one party is in a subordinate relationship to 
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the other (Richards & Tay 1977) and indeed seems to preclude the interpretation that the speaker 
is using her authority to compel the hearer to accept her assertion (e.g. as a teacher to a student, 
parent to child, etc.). For example, A is unable to use lah in (20a) when she tries to use her 
authority as B’s boss to convince B to accept her proposition; in contrast, lah in (20b) is 
acceptable when A explicitly states that she is not arguing from a position of authority. 
 
20) a. A: (to B) ? As your boss, I’m telling you that doing this would be good for you lah. 
b. A: (to B) As your friend, I’m telling you that doing this would be good for you lah. 
 
In this way, the observation that lah indicates social intimacy or solidarity (Bell & Ser 1983; 
Kwan-Terry 1978; Kwan-Terry 1992; Loke & Low 1988; Richards & Tay 1977) is accounted for, 
as the social closeness between speaker and hearer is a factor that is highlighted in particular 
when the hearer considers whether to accept the lah-marked proposition as being of high strength. 
Lah’s de-emphasising of speaker authority will be discussed again in section 5.2.3. 
 
5.2.2 Lah and discourse connectives 
 
Ler (2005) characterises lah as a signal for the hearer to access and accommodate an assumption 
in the speaker’s cognitive environment, after which the hearer has to indicate whether he has 
accessed the correct assumption in the speaker’s mind. However, she proposes that if the speaker 
changes her mind and wishes to carry on the line of talk, she can do so using discourse 
connectives such as but, you know, I mean, so and because to retain her turn, which would 
account for why lah tends to occur with discourse connectives when it is not used in sentence-
final position (304). The utterance introduced by the discourse connective is thus analysed by Ler 
(2005) as an “after-thought” (307) resulting from the speaker’s change of mind. However, I 
would argue that far from being afterthoughts, the utterances that the connectives introduce are 
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well-planned components of the communication structure the speaker is trying to convey to the 
hearer. For instance, consider (21): 
 
21) (A and C are talking about spring-cleaning before the Chinese New Year.) 
A: So I very slow one mah. Ya just do a little bit then you know go and do something 
else you see. 
C: Ah Aiyah. Can't get myself to start it also uhm uhm. 
A: But aiyah have to do it today lah because it's like so near already. 
C: Uhm. 
A: Left one and a half weeks only.    (ICE-SIN S1A-091) 
 
Following the argument in the previous section, lah asserts the preceding utterance as being of 
high strength. In (21), A is emphasising to B that she had to start spring-cleaning her place 
immediately in order to finish before the Chinese New Year in one and a half weeks’ time. 
Similar to examples in the previous section, lah here asserts the high strength of the lah-marked 
proposition “A has to spring-clean her house immediately” with the discourse connective 
because providing a justification for it. 
 
However, when lah is followed by the discourse connective but, it functions as a concession 
instead: 
 
22) (A and B are talking about problems with the building of a new country club.) 
A:  So they have ask[ed] for extension five times already. So eventually this BC 
[Building Controller] they say cannot so long already must disapprove. No more 
extension. 
B:  Then how now? Re-draw everything from scratch? 
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A: Can submit old [architectural] plans lah but it is like submitting the old drawings – 
same old thing. 
 
In (22), A is conceding that the old architectural plans for the country club can be submitted, but 
that it would not be an adequate solution to the problem. However, we see that lah is still 
asserting the high strength of the proposition here – effectively, lah can be glossed as “it is true 
that they can submit old architectural plans” with but introducing the qualification that doing so 
would not be sufficient to solve the problem. As such, generalising for other discourse 
connectives, I propose that the use of lah with a discourse connective is a planned conversation 
move that asserts or emphasises the truth of the lah-marked proposition in order for the speaker to 
build upon it with a subsequent elaboration introduced by the discourse connective. 
 
5.2.3 Lah and imperatives 
 
Ler (2005) explains how lah-marked imperatives can appear to be persuading or pleading as the 
speaker attempts to convey to the hearer the shared assumption behind her utterance. If the hearer 
is unable to recognise the shared assumption, the speaker’s insistence that he do so may also 
convey impatience or annoyance (298). This contrast is shown in (23): 
 
23) a. A: (to B) Come with us lah. (More polite)    (Ler 2005: 297) 
b. A: (to B) Eat your food lah. (More impatient)  (Ler 2005: 292) 
 
In (23a), the speaker uses lah to indicate to the hearer that it will be good for him to go along with 
them; in (23b), B does not appear to recognise that he should finish his food faster as they are 
late, despite the speaker’s use of lah, and this results in the sense of impatience in the imperative. 
However, as stated previously, Ler’s characterisation of lah as highlighting a shared assumption 
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seems to be too general, and it is unclear how the hearer can focus on the precise shared 
assumption that the speaker wishes to be highlighted each time, given how disparate the 
assumptions seem to be for each situation. Although I agree with Ler (2005) that lah’s pragmatic 
functions of softening an imperative and conveying hostility are not inherent functions of the 
particle, I believe that the characterisation of lah in the previous section – that lah asserts the high 
strength of the preceding proposition – can account better for its function in imperatives.  
 
As stated in Chapter 2, the uttered imperative ((23a)) encodes the fact that it is potential and 
desirable to either the speaker or hearer that the hearer makes real the situation described in the 
imperative ((24a)), and this proposition serves as a premise for the hearer to decide whether to 
obey the speaker or not. However, the hearer will not obey the speaker just because the latter has 
indicated that it is potential and desirable that the hearer do so, but only if there is sufficient 
motivation for the hearer to fulfil the speaker’s desire. For instance, if the speaker and her group 
are friends with the hearer, the hearer may decide to fulfil the speaker’s desire in order to make 
his friend happy. 
 
24) a. Premise 1: It is potential and desirable to the speaker and her group that the hearer 
follows them. 
b. Premise 2: The speaker and her group are friends with the hearer. 
c. Conclusion: (The hearer follows the speaker.) 
 
However, any increase in imperative force seems to be characterised by an emphasis on the 
speaker’s authority to compel or threaten the hearer: 
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25) a. A: Put your hands up.  
b. A: I am the police. Put your hands up.  
c. A: Put your hands up or I’ll shoot. 
 
Compared to (25a), (25b) has greater imperative force as A indicates to the hearer that she is the 
police, and thus has sufficient authority to compel the hearer to obey her imperative; (25c) has 
still greater imperative force as A motivates the hearer to obey the imperative by using a physical 
threat. In all these cases, A’s desire for the hearer to do what she wants him to is stated but not 
emphasised. 
 
Conversely, when a speaker emphasises her desire for the hearer to make the described situation 
actual, it implies that the speaker either has no authority to compel the hearer or chooses not to 
use her authority; in fact, there seems to be an inverse relationship between the extent of the 
speaker’s desire that is conveyed and the force of the imperative. Compared to (26a), (25c) and 
(25d) are markedly lower in imperative force, functioning in fact as pleas: 
 
26) a. A: Put your hands up. (Command) 
b. A: I want you to put your hands up. (Command/Request) 
c. A: I really want you to put your hands up. (Request/Plea) 
d. A: I really want so badly for you to put your hands up. (Plea) 
 
I propose that when lah is attached to imperatives, it is the proposition encoded by the imperative 
that is asserted as high strength, e.g. (24a). However, since the situation’s potentiality is generally 
presupposed in an imperative, lah emphasises solely the speaker’s desire for the situation 
described to be made actual. By highlighting the speaker’s desire rather than her authority over 
the hearer, the implication is that the speaker cannot compel the hearer to obey the imperative but 
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can only hope to persuade him to fulfil her desire. Since the speaker’s authority is no longer a 
motivating factor to the hearer, the hearer will most likely fulfil her desire if her happiness is 
important to him, e.g. in (24) where the speaker and hearer have a close social relationship. In 
support of this, we find that speakers will often highlight the close social relationship between the 
hearers and themselves in order to better convince the former to accede to their pleas, e.g. “Come 
with us (because I am your friend)” or “Help me (because I am your friend)”. 
 
Therefore, rather than attributing the differences in how lah changes the force of imperatives to 
the assumptions that the hearer is supposed to accept (Ler 2005), I propose that they can be more 
accurately accounted for by differences in the social relationship between speaker and hearer and 
the nature of the speaker’s desire for the situation described to be made actual. For example, lah 
emphasises in (23a) (reproduced as (27a)) the speaker's desire for the hearer to go along with 
them: 
 
27) a. A: (to B) Come with us lah. (More polite) 
b. A: (to B) Eat your food lah. (More impatient)  (Ler 2005) 
 
If we assume that A has no authority over B, e.g. if they are friends, B would recognise that A has 
no means to compel him into fulfilling her desire, and the particle would weaken the force of the 
imperative. The pragmatic effect of (23a) would be to indicate to B that A wishes to persuade B 
to go with her on the basis of their friendship, since that would be the strongest motivation for B 
to fulfil A's desire. 
 
In (27b), lah emphasises the speaker's desire for the hearer to eat faster. However, Ler (2005) 
describes both A and B as having to go off soon for an appointment, so B knows that he needs to 
eat his food quickly in order not to be late. In this situation, B is not just motivated to fulfil A’s 
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desire based on their friendship, but also for his own self-interest, and so interprets the lah-
marked imperative as a command or request rather than a plea. Like Ler (2005), I analyse the 
impatience that is conveyed in (23b) as an emotional state that is specific to the speaker in that 
situation, which is separate from the core meaning or even pragmatic function of lah (298). 
However, lah’s emphasis of A’s desire for B to eat faster does result in an increased sense of 
urgency that serves to complement A’s tone of impatience. 
 
The function of lah to persuade the hearer to carry out the lah-marked imperative by emphasising 
the close relationship between the speaker and the hearer is also consistent with the observation in 
section 5.2.1 that lah de-emphasises the speaker’s authority when indicating the lah-marked 
utterance’s high strength. In both cases, the speaker indicates to the hearer that her authority is to 
be irrelevant in the exchange, which would in turn highlight the speaker’s solidarity or rapport 
with the hearer in convincing the hearer to either believe the speaker’s utterance or to obey her 
imperative. 
 
5.3 The effect of intonation contour on lah 
 
In the previous chapter, I proposed that the intonation contour of hor can indicate to the hearer the 
grammatical mood of the utterance – a falling tone indicates an imperative mood while a rising 
tone indicates an interrogative mood. Given that the effect of intonation contour is independent 
from the discourse particle’s core meaning, one would expect it to apply to all CSE discourse 
particles that can be pronounced with different pitches, such as the particle lah. 
 
Previous literature distinguish three pitch contours that lah is consistently pronounced in: a low 
level pitch (Kwan-Terry (1978), Loke and Low (1988), Wong (2004)), a mid-rising pitch (Loke 
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and Low (1988), Wong (2004)) and a high falling pitch (Kwan-Terry (1978), Wong (2004)). 
However, Wong (2004) also notes a fourth high level variant that is of relatively low frequency, 
which will be covered in section 5.3.3. Following the terminology in Wong (2004), I propose in 
this chapter that the different pitches that lah can be pronounced in are not lexical tones that 
distinguish between different variants of the particle, but are intonation differences that are 
independent of the particle. This approach thus attempts to reconcile maintaining a unitary 
meaning of lah with acknowledging its different pragmatic functions that seem to correspond 
with the pitch with which the particle is pronounced. 
 
5.3.1 Low and falling pitch contours 
 
As elaborated in the previous chapter, Clark (1991) proposes that a low or falling tone signals 
affective resolution (196), and this correctly accounts for the stronger propositional nature of the 
low level and high falling pitch variants of lah (Loke & Low 1988: 156; Wong 2004: 773). For 
these two variants, lah’s core meaning indicates to the hearer the high strength of the lah-marked 
utterance, and the low and falling tones emphasise the speaker’s belief in or commitment to this 
assertion. 
 
5.3.1.1 Low level lah 
 
To illustrate how the effect of a low level intonation interacts with the core meaning of lah, 
consider (28): 
 
28) A: (to B) No need to count lah. I’m sure that the number is right. 
(Kwan-Terry 1992: 64) 
98 
 
p: [There is] no need to count. 
 
In (28), lah indicates to B that the lah-marked proposition, p, is of high strength, and the low level 
intonation indicates that A has taken this thought to be true. As such, B will interpret the 
utterance as A’s attempt to convince B about the truth of p. However, the force of such 
persuasion depends on contextual factors – as explained previously in section 5.2.3, whether lah 
is interpreted as “contribut[ing] an attitude of gentle persuasion to the utterance” (Kwan-Terry 
1992: 64) or a stronger ‘imposition’ of the speaker’s views onto the hearer (Wong 2004: 764) will 
depend on the emotional tone that the speaker conveys in her utterance, as well as the relationship 
between speaker and hearer.  
 
However, recall (11) (reproduced below as (29)): 
 
29) A: Maybe he goes to the park when he's free? 
B: He's got kidney problem and carries a bag around. 
A: So he cannot go anywhere lah.    (Wong 2004: 769) 
 
This is problematic for characterisations of lah that analyse the particle as asserting a proposition 
for the hearer’s acceptance, as A is trying to confirm her hypothesis with B rather than 
convincing B about it. In such cases, I propose that lah in (30) is interpreted in the same way as in 
(31): 
 
30) A: So he cannot go anywhere lah.     (Wong 2004: 769) 
 
p: He cannot go anywhere. 
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31) (A and B are discussing B’s recent holiday.) 
B: Ya we went to a lot of places and ate a lot of good food. 
A: So you had a good time lah. 
B: Ya. 
 
In (31), the proposition that A marks with lah is not a new one but rather a summary or 
conclusion of what B had said earlier. As stated in Chapter 3, the strength of a conclusion follows 
the strength of the premises from which it is derived (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 110), and so A’s 
conclusion (if correct) would be of high strength given the high strength of B’s earlier 
propositions (e.g. that he had fun going to different places and eating good food). A’s statement 
in (31) can thus be seen as a description of the conclusion that she has derived in her own 
cognitive environment, with lah indicating the high strength that A assigns to it – however, as the 
inferential route that A takes may be wrong, she would require B to either confirm or disprove 
this conclusion. 
 
Similarly, A concludes in (30) that, based on B’s words, the man with a kidney problem would 
not be able to go anywhere. In order to confirm her hypothesis, she presents it to B, using lah in 
(30) to indicate the high strength that she has assigned to it. The use of lah in such cases is thus 
accounted for: rather than changing the strength of a proposition in the hearer’s cognitive 
environment, lah indicates the high strength of a proposition from the speaker’s own cognitive 
environment, which the hearer then either confirms or disproves. 
  
5.3.1.2 High falling lah 
 
Although both low level and high falling variants indicate the speaker’s assertion of the high 
strength of the lah-marked proposition, the high falling variant would convey greater pragmatic 
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emphasis as its initial high pitch indicates greater stress than the low pitch of the former. The 
hearer may then interpret this greater pragmatic emphasis of the proposition’s high strength as 
indicating obviousness, accounting for Wong’s (2004) characterisation of la4 as a specific 
indicator of obviousness. Both Kwan-Terry’s (1978) characterisation of the contracted form lâ as 
conveying greater authority as well as irritation (24) and Loke and Low’s (1988) observation of 
high lah of long duration as expressing irritation (157) can also be explained, as the greater stress 
indicated by the high pitch contour may reflect these emotional stances from the speaker even 
though they are not inherent in the particle’s meaning. 
 
5.3.2 Mid-rising lah 
 
While a low or falling intonation signals affective resolution, a rising intonation signals affective 
non-resolution, or that the speaker is not entertaining the thought of which the proposition 
expressed is an interpretation (Clark 1991: 195). Although a rising intonation tends to signal 
questions, rather than interpreting utterances marked by mid-rising lah as true questions, I 
propose that they are interpreted in a way similar to rhetorical questions, e.g. (32b): 
 
32) a. A: (to B) I cannot do it lah. I really cannot.  (Wong 2004: 771) 
b. A: (to B) I cannot do it, okay? I really cannot. 
 
p: A cannot do what B wants. 
 
i. Unitary meaning of lah: p is high-strength. 




In contrast with a true request for information, in which the speaker requires information from the 
hearer to confirm or disprove the proposition that would be relevant to herself, the answer of a 
rhetorical question is already known to both speaker and hearer; in effect, the hearer is led to 
recognise that what the speaker is indirectly asserting is obviously true given the ‘obvious’ 
answer of the rhetorical question. Similarly, in (32a), A indicates that the assertion of p being of 
high strength is relevant to B; however, rather than asserting p as being of high strength directly, 
A leaves it to B to arrive at this conclusion himself. 
 
This accounts for Wong’s (2004) observation that mid-rising lah is “less effectual [...] as a 
persuasive tool” (772) than the low level variant. While he sees this difference in pragmatic force 
as the straightforward result of a difference in meaning between mid-rising and low level lah, I 
propose that it is due to a difference in grammatical mood arising from the different intonations of 
the utterances: 
 
33) (A is trying to stop B from buying a new car.) 
a. A: (to B) You are mad! You can’t afford a new car!  
b. A: (to B) Are you mad? You can’t afford a new car! 
 
p: B is mad in wanting to buy a new car. 
 
Comparing between (33a) and (33b), we see the same difference observed by Wong (2004): 
while A is directly asserting in (33a) that B is mad, her rhetorical question in (33b) appears to be 
less forceful as she is leading B to recognise for himself the obvious answer to the question, i.e. 
that he is mad. However, mid-rising lah does not just assert a proposition but the proposition’s 
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high strength, and thus its pragmatic function is to lead the hearer to recognise the lah-marked 
proposition’s high strength by himself and reject the opposite viewpoint, i.e. to convince or 
persuade the hearer of the truth of the proposition.  
 
5.3.3 High level lah 
 
Wong (2004) also notes that lah can be pronounced in a high level pitch, but did not include it in 
his study due to its relatively low frequency of use (762). However, any unified characterisation 
of lah must be able to accommodate its use, which, based on informal respondents as well as my 
own intuitions as a native speaker, superficially appears to be one of enumeration. Richards and 
Tay (1977) documents an example in Hokkien that nevertheless maintains its acceptability when 
translated into CSE: 
 
34) a. kè-nî gê sî-chueh tak-gê si thâi koe lah, thâi ah lah, bóe ti-kha lah, bóe bah lah. 
b. At New Year time, everyone kills chicken lah, kills duck lah, buys pigs’ trotters 
lah, buys pork lah... all these things.12 
 
Although one might be led to account for this function of lah by including some sort of 
enumerative feature in its semantic meaning, this is in fact unnecessary as the utterance can be 
interpreted as a list even without lah:  
 
35) At New Year time, everyone kills chicken... kills duck... buys pigs’ trotters... buys 
pork... all these things. 
                                                     
12 The phrase “all these things” were added to the CSE translation as it is unacceptable for high level lah to end 
an utterance. However, the meaning of the utterance (an enumeration of some of the ways people prepare for 
Chinese New Year) remains unchanged. 
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The factor contributing to the interpretation of (34) and (35) as lists seems to be the high level 
intonation of the noun phrases (“chicken”, “duck”, etc.). Goh (2000) characterises the level tone 
in CSE as being associated with “short tone units and indicates incomplete information" (40), and 
gives the following as an example: 
 
36) //Æ so i would classiFY YOU// Æ as the TRUE// Æ SMART// ÆconsuMER// 
(Stresses capitalised, ‘//’ indicates a tone group and ‘Æ’ indicates a level tone within 
the tone group.)      (Goh 2000: 40) 
 
Similarly, Halliday (1970) characterises a mid-level intonation in British Standard English as 
expressing “some form of dependence or incompleteness” (24). As such, I propose that, in 
relevance-theoretic terms, the high level pitch indicates to the hearer that the utterance is not 
intended to supply the desired relevance by itself, but must be interpreted in parallel with 
subsequent utterances. For instance, when (37a) ends with a high level pitch instead of a low 
falling pitch, the hearer interprets the utterance as an item on a list, and expects the speaker to 
continue the list ((37c) and (37d)): 
 
37) a. A:  He is fat. (Low falling pitch) 
b. A:  * He is fat. (High level pitch) 
c. A: He is fat (High level pitch), ugly (High level pitch), and greedy (Low falling 
pitch).  




Since the effect of the high level pitch conveys a sense of incompleteness, or a sense that the 
utterance is an example, we would expect that this sense would be emphasised by lah. How lah 
functions in (34) (reproduced below as (38)) can thus be analysed as follows: 
 
38) At New Year time, everyone kills chicken lah, kills duck lah, buys pigs’ trotters lah, 
buys pork lah... all these things.  
(During Chinese New Year, everyone performs tasks like killing chickens (as an 
individual, non-exhaustive example), killing ducks (as another individual, non-
exhaustive example), buying pigs’ trotters (as another individual, non-exhaustive 
example) and buying pork (as another individual, non-exhaustive example).) 
 
p: p1 : Everyone kills chicken [during Chinese New Year]; 
p2 : Everyone kills duck [during Chinese New Year]; 
p3 : Everyone buys pigs’ trotters [during Chinese New Year]; 
p4 : Everyone buys pork [during Chinese New Year] 
 
a. Unitary meaning of lah: p is high-strength. 
b. Meaning of high level lah: [p is incomplete] is high-strength. 
 
In (38), killing chickens, killing ducks, buying pigs’ trotters, and buying pork are interpreted as 
four individual, non-exhaustive exemplars of tasks that people perform during Chinese New 
Year, which together may suggest other related tasks that people may perform in preparation for 
Chinese New Year. Lah in a high level tone can thus be characterised as emphasising to the 
hearer the incompleteness of the lah-marked proposition, prompting him to access other 
propositions of which the lah-marked proposition is an exemplar. 
 
(39) provides further support for this analysis of high level lah: 
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39) (B is asking A about the secretary training course she had attended recently.) 
B:  What was the training like? 
a. A:  We learnt how to answer calls lah, take notes lah, all these things. 
b. A: * We just learnt three things – how to answer calls lah, take notes lah, (and) 
prepare for meetings lah. 
c. A: We just learnt three things – how to answer calls (High level pitch), take notes 
(High level pitch), and prepare for meetings. 
 
Even though A responded to B’s question with a list in (39a), she is not telling B that the training 
only involved answering calls and taking notes, but that the two are non-exhaustive examples of 
what the training involved. In contrast, we see that while a high level intonation is still acceptable 
when used in an exhaustive list in (39c), high level lah is unable to enumerate an exhaustive list 
in (39b). 
 
5.3.4 Lah and interrogatives  
 
Wee (2004) observes that lah can appear with wh-interrogatives but not polar interrogatives or 
declaratives functioning as a question13, and noted that “[a]t present, it is not clear how these 
constraints can be accounted for” (119). Although Ler (2005) tried to account for this by arguing 
that a polar interrogative “is a bald request for information with no other assumptions to be 
                                                     
13 Gupta (2006) notes that “[a] wh-interrogative with an assertive particle is unlikely to be a question” (254)  and 
analyses “Why you do that lah?” as either a directive for the hearer to desist his actions or a rebuke. In fact, many 
of my informants find lah to be only acceptable in rhetorical questions that do not require an answer (lah would 
be pronounced with a mid-rising intonation in this case), while some feel that low level lah is acceptable for 
questions that function pragmatically as imperatives, e.g. “What is your name lah?” (Tell me your name!). 
Currently, due to the limitations of this thesis, how lah is interpreted with interrogatives is unclear, and more 
research is required to clarify this issue. 
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accessed” (315), this line of argument would not be able to explain cases in which the speaker 
wants an answer from the hearer, while at the same time wanting him to access an assumption 
such as her impatience: 
 
40) (A is shopping for a laptop with B.) 
A: So are you getting this laptop? 
B: I’m not sure... I like how it looks but it’s a bit expensive... But it also has a lot of 
functions... I don’t know... 
A: ? We’ve been shopping for hours! Do you like it lah? If you do then we’re buying 
it. 
 
Instead, I will attribute the contrast in how lah is used between polar interrogatives and  
wh-interrogatives to the difference in how wh-interrogatives and polar interrogatives are 




As elaborated in Chapter 2, interrogatives are taken as representations of thoughts desirable to the 
speaker – Sperber and Wilson (1988) propose that “a thought is desirable only if it is relevant” 
(23), and therefore interrogatives indicate propositions that would be immediately relevant to the 
speaker if the hearer confirms them to be true. To illustrate, consider (41): 
 
41) A: What's the in thing [in Thailand]? 
... 
B: In thing? I’m not quite sure. What is ‘in thing’? 
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A: I mean like the clothes. What’s in fashion lah?14  (ICE-SIN S1A-003) 
 
Encoded in A’s question “What’s the in thing [in Thailand]?” is the logical form “x is the in thing 
in Thailand”, where x is the piece of information that B is supposed to supply; with the question, 
A is telling B that the proposition “x is the in thing in Thailand” is desirable, i.e. relevant, to her 
so that B will supply her with the desired piece of information x. Lah can generally be 
pronounced with either a low level intonation or a mid-rising intonation with wh-interrogatives, 
functioning differently depending on the intonation. 
 
Similar to its function in imperatives, low level lah serves in wh-interrogatives to assert the high 
strength of the proposition that the information the hearer is requested to supply is desirable to the 
speaker. In (41), A has asserted that the proposition “x is the in thing in Thailand” is relevant to 
her, but B does not understand her question and thus is unable to supply the relevant proposition, 
prompting A to rephrase her question. Unlike Ler (2005), who interprets lah as highlighting the 
shared assumption “A disapproves of B’s ignorance” (276), I would argue that lah merely 
reiterates to B the desirability of the requested proposition (since it was not supplied after the 
previous question), which serves to emphasise it (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 219).  
 
However, while low level lah in imperatives emphasises the speaker’s desire for the hearer to 
carry out the imperative, lah in wh-interrogatives does not emphasise the speaker’s desire for the 
hearer to supply the answer to the question but merely that the answer is relevant. As such, while 
lah in an imperative weakens its pragmatic force as it indicates to the hearer that the speaker 
either has no authority to compel the hearer’s compliance or chooses not to use it, lah does not 
                                                     
14 Given that ICE-SIN does not code for punctuation, it is possible that A’s utterance is the declarative “[The ‘in 
thing’ is] what’s in fashion lah.” rather than a wh-interrogative. However, it is still acceptable to interpret the 
utterance as a question that is marked by a low level lah, and this is what I do here. 
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have any softening effect in a wh-interrogative. In fact, the reiterated indication of the answer’s 
relevance to the speaker may be considered rude or convey irritation or annoyance, which would 
account for Ler’s observation that lah may be used to convey the speaker’s disapproval (2005: 
276). 
 
In section 5.3.2, mid-rising lah is analysed as a rhetorical question that conveys the proposition 
that the confirmation of the high strength of the lah-marked proposition is relevant to the hearer, 
Consistent with this analysis, wh-interrogatives that are marked with mid-rising lah tend to be 
interpreted as rhetorical questions, e.g.: 
 
42) a. A: Why you do that lah? (You should not have done that.)   
(Gupta 2006: 254) 
b. (A is trying to assemble a bucket and spade set.) 
A: Aiya. How you to make lah? (No one can make this.)  
(Gupta 1992: 43)  
 
5.3.4.2 Polar interrogatives  
 
While wh-interrogatives encode incomplete propositions that require the hearer to complete, polar 
interrogatives encode complete propositions. Sperber and Wilson (1988) propose that in the polar 
interrogatives (43a-c): 
 
43) a. Did you see Susan? 
b. Didn’t you see Susan? 
c. Did you or did you not see Susan? 
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(43a) expresses that a positive answer to the question is more relevant than a negative answer, or 
that both are equally relevant; (43b) expresses that a negative answer to the question is more 
relevant; and (43c) expresses that both answers are equally relevant, or that the speaker is 
impatient or annoyed with the hearer (23). For example, in a situation where the speaker had 
originally believed that the hearer had seen Susan at a party and now has reason to doubt this, the 
negative answer to “Did you see Susan?” would be more relevant as it contradicts and eliminates 
the speaker’s prior assumption that the hearer had seen Susan, in comparison to a positive answer 
that merely confirms her prior assumption. However, this does not mean that a positive answer is 
not relevant at all, but only that it would be less relevant in context than a negative one. 
 
As such, while lah can be used to assert the high strength of the desirability of a proposition “x is 
the in thing in Thailand”, it cannot be used in a polar interrogative like “Did you see Susan lah?”, 
as lah would emphasise in this case the desirability of a positive answer over and above its 
default level as compared with a negative answer, which would be odd. In contrast, an emphasis 
of desirability of either a positive or negative answer is possible, and in support of this, we find 
that only (44c) is acceptable: 
 
44) a. * Did you see Susan lah? 
b. * Didn’t you see Susan lah? 




This chapter has proposed that lah asserts the lah-marked proposition as being of high strength. 
While the particle does serve to weaken imperatives, I have argued that this is a result of the 
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particle emphasising the speaker’s desire for the lah-marked description of a potential situation to 
be made actual by the hearer instead of the speaker’s authority over the hearer. The ability of lah 
to be used with wh-interrogatives but not polar interrogatives can also be accounted for by lah’s 
assertion of high strength, which is incompatible with polar interrogatives’ indication of one 
answer being more relevant than its polar opposite. 
 
This chapter also elaborates on the proposal made in the previous chapter that a particle’s 
pragmatic function can be analysed as an interaction between its intonation and its core meaning. 
Instead of positing four lexical variants of lah, I propose that the various pragmatic functions that 
have been attributed to lah arise from the interaction between this core meaning and the four 
different pitch contours that lah can be pronounced in (following Wong (2004)). Using this 
analytical framework, the ‘impositional’ nature of low level lah can be attributed to the authority 
associated with the low level pitch contour, while the relatively weaker force of the mid-rising lah 
can be explained by its similarity to rhetorical questions. The framework can also accommodate 
high level lah, which functions as an enumerative marker; this use of lah has been ignored in 




DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This thesis analyses three CSE discourse particles – lor, hor, and lah – and attempts to reconcile a 
unitary characterisation of these discourse particles with the observed correspondence between 
their pragmatic functions and the pitch contours that these particles can be pronounced in. As Ler 
(2005) and Wong (2004) have highlighted, many characterisations of CSE particles (e.g. Bell and 
Ser (1983), Gan (2000), Kwan-Terry (1978), Loke and Low (1988), Marie (1988), Platt and Ho 
(1987)) have conflated a particle’s meaning and function, documenting a particle’s pragmatic 
functions as its meaning. Although the function of a particle does depend on its meaning, I follow 
Ler (2005; 2006) in arguing that recovering a particle’s intended function requires the hearer to 
process its meaning together with contextual information rather than retrieving it directly from 
the particle’s encoded meaning. Distinguishing between a particle’s encoded meaning and its 
pragmatic functions also allows unitary characterisations for each of the three particles that will 
nevertheless be able to account for their multiple pragmatic functions. 
 
Relevance theory was chosen as the analytical framework of this thesis as it is able to describe 
with precision how the hearer processes a particle’s encoded meaning with specific contextual 
information to derive its various pragmatic functions. By analysing the intonation of a particle as 
a piece of contextual information, this thesis is able to lay out the possible interactions between a 
particle’s encoded meaning and how it is pronounced, which proved to be better able to account 




6.1 Characterisations of lor, hor and lah 
 
In order to analyse how a particle’s unitary semantic meaning can produce multiple pragmatic 
functions, this thesis focuses on three CSE discourse particles – lor, hor, and lah – that have 
sometimes been characterised as being polysemous or as having different lexical variants. In each 
chapter, I derived a procedural meaning for one particle based on how it is used in conversation, 
and modelled the pragmatic processing that occurs in order for the hearer to recover the intended 
pragmatic functions of the particles during conversation. For the hor and lah particles, I have also 
analysed the pitch contours they can be pronounced in as signals of modality that interact with 
their core meaning to affect how hearers interpret them. Finally, as previous characterisations 
have generally focused on the particles’ use with declaratives rather than non-declaratives, i.e. 
interrogatives and imperatives, I have also attempted to account for why hor and lor can only be 
used with some types of imperatives but not others, as well as how lah is used with interrogatives. 
 
6.1.1 The lor particle 
 
In Chapter 3, I characterise lor as a marker to indicate that the immediately relevant proposition is 
manifest in the hearer’s cognitive environment. The common pragmatic function of lor to mark 
obviousness is thus captured in this characterisation: as the speaker should have been able to 
derive a manifest proposition from the existing assumptions present in her cognitive environment, 
the immediately relevant proposition would be seen as being ‘obvious’. The concept of the 
‘immediately relevant proposition’ is introduced to account for lor’s ability to mark a proposition 
as being obvious even when it is attached to the proposition’s premise.  
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Although Wee (2002) analyses lor as being polysemous between obviousness and a sense of 
resignation, I analyse lor’s function of marking resignation as an additional contextual 
implication that hearers derive from recognising a proposition as manifest. A speaker may use lor 
to indicate that the state of affairs being described is a manifest conclusion: since a manifest 
conclusion is deductively derived from its premises, it cannot be changed as long as its premises 
remain constant. If the hearer understands that the speaker is unhappy about the described state of 
affairs and sees it as being undesirable, he will interpret the unhappiness that the speaker conveys 
together with her indication that she recognises the state of affairs as being beyond her control as 
resignation. This characterisation of lor thus analyses its function of conveying resignation as a 
result of the hearer’s pragmatic processing rather than an inherent meaning of the particle that 
emerged through grammaticalisation (Wee 2002). 
 
This characterisation also accounts for Gupta’s (1992) observation that lor cannot mark direct 
imperatives such as requests even if they are obvious ones, although advice, suggestions and 
permissions are acceptable with the particle. From a relevance-theoretic perspective, the cognitive 
effect of a direct imperative is the non-verbal action that the speaker wishes the hearer to perform, 
and so there is no immediately relevant proposition in a direct imperative for lor to mark. In 
contrast, the cognitive effect of suggestions and advice is the hearer’s recognition that the state of 
affairs described by the imperative is potential and desirable to himself, and thus the immediately 
relevant proposition that lor marks as manifest is the potential nature and desirability to the hearer 
of the state of affairs described by the imperative. 
 
6.1.2 The hor particle 
 
In Chapter 4, I propose that the hor particle encodes the proposition that the hor-marked 
proposition is accessible to the hearer. As hor can be pronounced with either a rising or falling 
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intonation, the hearer does not just recover its encoded procedural meaning but processes it based 
on its intonation to derive the pragmatic function intended by the speaker. I propose that the 
intonation of hor serves as a signal for modality – a rising intonation indicates that hor’s encoded 
meaning should be interpreted as a question while a falling intonation indicates that its encoded 
meaning should be interpreted as an imperative. 
 
This characterisation of hor explains why hor, pronounced with a falling intonation, can only be 
used with reminders rather than direct imperatives, as the particle instructs the hearer to make the 
speaker’s desire of the described state of affairs accessible in his cognitive environment, i.e. to 
remind the hearer that the speaker wishes him to obey the hor-marked imperative. In this way, 
hor strips the imperative of its imperative force, and thus also functions as a politeness device to 
soften imperatives into strong reminders. 
 
With a rising intonation, hor indicates that the speaker wishes to confirm that the hor-marked 
proposition is accessible in the hearer’s cognitive environment. This characterisation analyses 
rising-tone hor’s function as a topic marker in the same way as its function to solicit agreement  
– by checking the accessibility of the hor-marked proposition to the hearer, rising-tone hor 
highlights the marked proposition in conversation, after which the speaker may either use the 
hearer’s agreement to the marked proposition or the marked proposition itself as a springboard for 
further conversation. 
 
6.1.3 The lah particle 
 
In Chapter 5, I propose that the particle lah encodes an indication to the hearer that the lah-
marked proposition is of high strength. As stated in Chapter 2, the strength of a proposition in 
relevance theory is defined as a measure of the confidence a person attributes to its truth value, 
115 
and this indication by the speaker that a proposition is of high strength functions pragmatically in 
a number of ways. 
 
When lah is used with declaratives, the hearer will interpret the particle as a procedural 
instruction for him to take the lah-marked proposition as being of high strength. Pragmatically, 
the particle serves to emphasise the truth of the speaker’s utterance, and in this way is consistent 
with previous analyses that describe lah as an assertive marker (Gupta (1992), Kwan-Terry 
(1978), Wong (2004)). However, other than requesting the hearer to interpret the lah-marked 
utterance as being of high strength, this particle may also be used to advance the high strength of 
a proposition in the speaker’s own cognitive environment for the hearer’s confirmation, 
functioning pragmatically to mark the speaker’s proposed summary of a given situation. 
 
I argue that pragmatically, lah also specifically indicates that any authority the speaker has over 
the hearer is irrelevant in interpreting the lah-marked utterance. As such, in order to assess 
whether to revise the strength of the lah-marked proposition based on the speaker’s indication, 
the hearer will have to consider instead the social relationship between the speaker and himself, 
as he will trust the speaker more if they have a closer relationship. This therefore accounts for the 
observed function of lah to mark solidarity or social intimacy – the hearer recognises the 
speaker’s intention of using the social relationship between them, rather than her authority over 
him, to justify her request for the hearer to increase the strength of the lah-marked proposition. 
 
Similar to hor, lah’s multiple pragmatic functions are also analysed in Chapter 5 as results of the 
particle’s core meaning interacting with intonation as a signal of modality. Following Chapter 4, I 
argue that low and falling intonations signal declaratives, and this accounts for Wong’s (2004: 
773) observation that both low level lah and high falling lah have stronger propositional natures, 
as the particles indicate to the hearer that the lah-marked proposition is of high strength. In 
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contrast, a rising intonation signals interrogatives, and so I analyse mid-rising lah as a rhetorical 
tag question that is similar to ‘okay?’. As rhetorical questions require the hearer to supply the 
answer rather than it being imposed by the speaker, this explains why mid-rising lah is 
propositionally weaker than the lah pronounced with other intonations. 
 
6.2 Areas of further study 
 
6.2.1 Intonational properties of CSE particles 
 
Gupta (2006) notes that “the intonation contour [of a particle] also relates to the force of the 
particle, whose meaning it interacts with” (250). This thesis attempted to answer how the 
particle’s intonation contour interacts with its meaning by proposing that a particle’s intonation 
serves as a signal for modality, which changes how the hearer interprets the procedural 
instruction encoded by the particle. Although such an analysis is useful for particles that can be 
pronounced with different pitch contours, how it applies to particles that can only be pronounced 
in one way remains unclear. Wong (2004) notes that many CSE loan words from Chinese 
languages retain lexical tone from their language of origin (760), and so it is possible that the 
hearer will interpret the intonation of particles that cannot be pronounced with multiple tones as a 
‘default’ tone that does not carry intonational meaning. However, although Wong argues that “the 
fact that some particles cannot be pronounced with certain pitch contours while others can, 
indicates that lexical tones are involved” (2004: 760), another possibility is that the semantic 
meaning of a particle may restrict the intonation contours it can take. For instance, consider (32b) 
in Chapter 5: 
 
32b) A: (to B) I cannot do it, okay? I really cannot. 
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The tag okay can only be pronounced with a rising intonation when it occurs at the end of 
propositions, but it is clearly not the case that okay with a rising tone is a separate lexical variant 
from okay with a falling tone. In (32b), the function of okay as a tag question that is attached to a 
proposition is only consistent with a rising intonation, and thus cannot be pronounced with any 
other pitch contour. By the same argument, it is possible that the strong contradictory nature of 
wat is only consistent with a low level intonation, which seems to contribute the strongest 
propositional force when compared across the three pitch contours that lah can take. 
 
6.2.2 Characterising CSE particles as a system 
 
Although Ler (2005; 2006) describes the CSE discourse particle system as one where “the 
different particles indicate various ways in which relevance can be achieved” (29), she uses 
relevance theory mainly as an analytical framework to examine individual particles and does not 
offer any wider observations about the functions of CSE particles in relation to one another. 
However, I propose that CSE particles can be categorised based on how this relevance is achieved 
by the hearer – by either strengthening or weakening the strength of an existing assumption in the 
hearer’s cognitive environment, eliminating an existing utterance, or combining with an existing 
utterance to yield a contextual effect (Sperber & Wilson 1995: 115) as elaborated in Chapter 2.  
 
This relevance-theoretic framework would complement Gupta’s (1992; 2006) characterisation of 
CSE particles as indicating the speaker’s commitment to the propositional content of the 
utterance. As Gupta (2006) concedes, “while what, lah and ah fit easily on an assertiveness cline, 
it is difficult to use a single cline to distinguish the meaning of particles at the same point on the 
scale, and less common particles [...] appear to be on the cline, while contributing meanings 
distinct from each another that [the framework] have not be able to capture” (258). However, 
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Gupta’s cline of assertiveness can be analysed as a restricted case in the relevance-theoretic 
framework, specifically the function of a particle to strengthen or weaken the strength of the 
proposition expressed by the utterance the particle is attached to. As the analyses in the previous 
chapters illustrate, the meanings that Gupta’s assertiveness framework is not able to cover can be 
analysed in relevance-theoretic terms as contextual effects that result from the hearer combining 
the proposition expressed by the utterance with existing assumptions. 
 
Given its limited scope, this thesis is unable to provide relevance-theoretic characterisations of all 
particles in the CSE discourse particle system, and thus cannot describe in detail how the different 
particles would fit under a single system. However, I believe that that the productivity of using a 
relevant-theoretic approach for the other particles is demonstrated through the findings of this 
thesis. Having relevance-theoretic characterisations of the other particles also provides a common 
terminology with which different CSE particles can be compared and contrasted, addressing the 
issue of a fragmentary theoretical landscape that was raised in Chapter 1. In addition, such a 
unified framework would hopefully allow us to answer more general theoretical questions. For 
instance, although we have particles expressing a speaker’s state of mind such as scepticism 
(meh) and resignation (lor) (Wee 2004: 126), why are there no particles that express more general 
emotions such as sadness or excitement? Given that new CSE particles have been created (e.g. 
know (Wee 2003)), what are the criteria for their creation? Answers to these questions would be 
essential in helping CSE linguists understand the fundamental question: why do we have the 
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